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FOREWORD
An estimated 2.6 billion people live on less than $2 a day.   Over 
a billion lack clean water, 1.6 billion lack electricity and 3 billion 
lack access to telecommunications. This represents huge unmet 
needs. As many of the world’s poor live in areas with limited 
state service provision they must rely on private markets for 
their livelihoods.  As consumers, poor men and women rely on 
markets to meet their needs for food and essential services.  As 
employees or producers, they sell their labour or products in 
these markets. But these markets are often difficult or costly 
to access for poor people.  These markets may be informal, un- 
competitive and may not meet the needs of the poor effectively. 
More widely, the world’s poor are not well integrated into 
the global economy and do not get access to its benefits. In 
Development as Freedom,  Amartya Sen describes participation 
in economic interchange as a basic part of social living and 
argues that economic freedoms are closely tied to political and 
social freedoms. The poor often lack these freedoms.
Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) is an approach to 
poverty reduction that donors such as the Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC) have been supporting 
over the past few years. The central idea is that the poor are 
dependent on market systems for their livelihoods.  Therefore 
changing those market systems to work more effectively and 
sustainably for the poor will improve their livelihoods and 
consequently reduce poverty. More accessible and competitive 
markets enable poor people to find their own way out of 
poverty by providing more real choices and opportunities. 
Markets that function well have wider economic benefits too. 
They stimulate investment and encourage firms to innovate, 
reduce costs and provide better quality jobs, goods and 
services to more people. The involvement of poor people in 
economic growth is the best way to get people out of poverty 
and represents the exit strategy for aid.  
The last few years have seen an upsurge of interest in market 
development approaches amongst aid agencies.  Alongside 
M4P there is UNDP’s Growing Inclusive Markets, the IADB’s 
Opportunities for the Majority and the IFC’s Next Four Billion. 
Amongst businesses, there is growing interest in social investment, 
sustainable business practices, fair trade and engaging with the 
Base of the (Economic) Pyramid. Although terminology and 
emphasis may differ, all of these approaches see a market-based 
economic engagement with the poor as essential for sustainable 
development.
In order to improve the understanding and uptake of market 
development approaches and to consolidate existing experience, 
DFID and SDC have commissioned a series of three documents 
on M4P.  Aimed at agency and government officials, consultants, 
researchers and practitioners, these together provide a 
comprehensive overview of the approach in theory and 
practice.
The M4P Synthesis paper (this document) explains the essence 
of the M4P approach – its rationale, including evidence of 
impact, and key features in implementation.  M4P Perspectives 
introduces the conceptual underpinnings of M4P and explores 
its application in different fields including finance, agriculture, 
water, labour and climate change.  These first two documents 
have been sponsored by SDC.  The M4P Operational Guide 
(sponsored by DFID) provides a substantial operational 
resource on how to implement M4P, including an overview of 
good practices, common management challenges and the main 
lessons from experience.
Development of these documents was led by a team from The 
Springfield Centre. They were assisted by advice and comments 
from Marshall Bear, gerry Bloom, Richard Boulter, Don Brown, 
Jean-Christophe Favre, Tracy gerstle, Alison griffith, Justin 
Highstead, Joanna ledgerwood, Marc lundy, luis Osorio, 
Alexandra Miehlbradt, Mark Napier, Kate Philip, David Porteous, 
Peter Roggekamp, Prashant Rana, Hugh Scott, Dominic Smith 
and Jim Tomecko.
All of these documents are also available in electronic form 
at www.M4Pnetwork.org.  We hope you find them helpful 
in meeting the challenge of developing market systems that 
benefit poor people.
Peter Tschumi
Head of Employment and Income Division
SDC, Berne 
Harry Hagan
Senior Economic Adviser and Head of growth Team
growth & Investment group, Policy & Research Division
DFID, london
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Agencies: development organisations – funded by aid or other 
non-commercial sources – who act as funders or facilitators in 
pursuit of developing market systems. 
Approach: a set of principles, frameworks and good practice 
points to guide both analysis of a market system and actions to 
bring about change.
Asymmetric information: when one party in a market 
trans-action – supplier or consumer – knows more than the other. 
Basic services: a range of services important in building people’s 
capacities, where consumption serves not just individuals but 
impacts on the wider economy and society. This includes 
education, health, water and sanitation.
BDs: business development services.
BMo: business membership organisation or business association
(see Representative organisation).
core function: the central set of exchanges between providers 
(supply-side) and consumers (demand-side) of goods and 
services at the heart of a market system. The medium of 
exchange can be financial or non-financial (such as through 
accountability mechanisms).
crowding-in: the central process in – and purpose of – 
facilitation through which interventions catalyse or bring other 
players and functions into the market system so that it works 
better for the poor. Crowding-in can result in enhanced breadth 
(more transactions in the core of a market), depth (supporting 
functions) or reach (new areas or markets).
externalities: negative or positive spill-over effects that are not 
reflected in a market price.
facilitation / facilitator: action or agent that is external to a 
market system but seeks to bring about change within a market 
system in order to achieve the public benefit objective of 
systemic change.
gift exchange: exchange based around shared values and 
reciprocity that is non-financial but still conducted on an informal 
transactional basis.
hierarchical exchange: exchange where one party, for example 
a large firm, has relatively more power in setting the terms of 
exchange with vertically-integrated suppliers.
institutions: structures and mechanisms of social, political 
and economic order and cooperation – formal and informal 
– in a society/economy which shape the incentives and 
behaviour of market players.  Institutions therefore refer both 
to the supporting functions and rules – sometimes referred to 
collectively as ‘rules of the game’– in a market system.
intervention: a defined package of temporary activities or 
actions through which facilitators seek to affect change in a 
market system. 
Lead	firms: businesses capable of exerting a leading influence 
on other firms and other players because of, for example, 
their size or their reputation for innovation.
M4P: the making markets work for the poor or market 
development approach.
Market: a set of arrangements by which buyers and sellers are 
in contact to exchange goods or services; the interaction of 
demand and supply. 
Market player: organisations or individuals who are active in 
a market system not only as suppliers or consumers but as 
regulators, developers of standards and providers of services, 
information, etc. This therefore may include organisations in the 
private and public sectors as well as non-profit organisations, 
representative organisations, academic bodies and civil society 
groups.
Market system: the multi-player, multi-function arrangement 
comprising three main sets of functions (core, rules and 
supporting) undertaken by different players (private sector, 
government, representative organisations, civil society etc) 
through which exchange takes place, develops, adapts and 
grows. A construct through which both conventionally-defined 
markets and basic services can be viewed.
organisations:  entities with a formal structure that play a range 
of roles in the market system.
glOSSARy
Public goods: goods or services which are non-rival and 
non-excludable and therefore cannot be offered by private 
firms.
representative organisation: an organisation which acts to 
advance the interests of a specific group, such as a trade union 
or a consumer rights body. Also referred to as a membership 
organisation (see also BMO).
rules: formal (laws, regulations and standards) and informal 
(values, relationships and social norms) controls that provide 
a key input in defining incentives and behaviour in market 
systems.
supporting functions: a range of functions supporting the core 
exchange helping the market to develop, learn, adapt and grow 
including, for example, product development, skills enhancement, 
R & D, coordination and advocacy.
Sustainability	(M4P	definition): the market capability to ensure 
that relevant, differentiated goods and services continue to be 
offered to and consumed by the poor beyond the period of an 
intervention.
strategic framework: a hierarchy of objectives linking an M4P 
programme’s final goal of poverty reduction with an intervention 
focus on sustainable market system change.
systemic change: change in the underlying causes of market 
system performance – typically in the rules and supporting 
functions – that can bring about more effective, sustainable and 
inclusive functioning of the market system.
tools/instruments: relatively standardised methodologies for 
market analysis (eg value chain analysis or usage, attitude and 
image surveys) or for intervention (e.g. vouchers or challenge 
funds).
transaction costs: the costs associated with the basic process 
of exchange including costs concerned with searching, screening, 
negotiating, contracting, monitoring and enforcing transactions; 
the ‘‘cost of running the economic system’’ (Arrow, 1969).
glOSSARy
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OvERvIEW
Nothing much seems to be going right 
for Jyoti. She wants her four kids to have 
the education she didn’t but the teacher 
at the village school, even when he does 
turn up, seems only half-interested. Jyoti 
doesn’t know what to do about it. She 
does know what she’d like to do with her 
youngest. He’s sick and she’d like to take 
him to the private doctor in the nearby 
town, but she can’t afford the fees. So she 
can only try her luck at the government 
clinic.
Money is tight. She and her husband 
work hard on their small patch of land 
– and on any they can lease – but the 
returns are small.  They never seem to get 
better prices at the local market, while 
other farmers seem to squeeze more 
production from their lands. They have 
always gone to a relative for their inputs – 
seeds, fertiliser, pesticide – and his advice 
has always been to use more.
Jyoti thinks that they’re coping just now 
but, when she allows her mind to think 
ahead, she can’t really envisage how 
things might get better.
Rahim is in two minds over globalisation. 
On the one hand, he knows that the fast-
growing food processing factory where 
he is employed depends on exports. His 
job and wages – and the amount he can 
send to his extended family back in his 
village (many of whom have no job) – are 
all derived from overseas markets. His 
concerns have the same source. 
Stories circulate in the company about 
stiff competition from other countries. 
Foreign buyers, previously the bringers 
of orders and prosperity, are, according 
to his manager, now becoming more 
demanding. They don’t just want the 
same ‘old stuff ’; they want ‘higher quality’, 
‘safer’, ‘compliant’ with higher standards, 
‘pre-packaged’, ‘quicker’ and ‘more reliable’. 
They want ‘better’… and would prefer to 
pay nothing more for it.
How is the company going to achieve 
this? It needs to change, but how? Who 
can advise it? Rahim worries and ponders 
whether he should reduce his weekly 
payment to the family.  Just in case.
Sam’s a natural optimist but even he has 
to recognise that his vision of turning his 
small machine shop into a sub-contractor 
to large companies is a pipedream. 
He can’t meet their quality or delivery 
standards and he’s never really had a 
chance to meet those people anyway.
In the meantime, he has more pressing 
problems. One customer has decided 
not to pay the full amount for his order. 
Although Sam has pleaded, he knows that 
the courts are too expensive and complex 
for him – his customer also knows this. 
He’s asked his business association for 
advice but they seem equally powerless.
Sam feels that a better deal from the 
bank would help his immediate cash 
flow problems and provide capital for 
investment in new equipment. But Sam’s 
bank seems unmoved by his requests. 
legally, they can’t accept his ageing plant 
as collateral and when he produced 
the title deeds to his village land, they 
disputed their authenticity. The optimism 
of ‘Enterprise Sam’ is being tested.
1
the context
This paper is about how to improve the lives, fundamentally, of 
Jyoti, Rahim and Sam and the billions of other poor and excluded 
like them, by making market systems work more effectively.
‘Poor people’, of course, are very diverse. They come from different 
locations, urban and rural; they have different cultures and values; 
they have different livelihoods and expectations. Different, yes, but 
in many ways also alike. They share a sense that their lives could 
be better and, like Jyoti, Rahim and Sam, face a common reality; 
for their lives to improve, their immediate environment needs to 
change. In particular the markets and services around them, the 
‘market systems’ which are often failing, and are an underlying 
cause of their problems, need to work better for people like 
them.
For Jyoti, living in a rural area, the key to higher incomes is better 
markets for agriculture inputs and outputs. Without the right 
information to hand, she doesn’t have the right answers to basic 
questions – what to use, how to grow, what to grow, when to sell, 
who to sell to. Higher incomes would clearly help her but only 
to some extent. The services available to her family – especially 
education and health, supposedly provided by the government 
– are barely functional. But her limited access to effective channels 
of representation makes it hard to push for change. And without 
improvement here, her children’s vulnerability remains high, their 
opportunity low.
Rahim’s situation is different.  He and his family have benefited from 
the success of the company he works for in newly-open export 
markets, and the growth it has generated. But his employment is 
now tied to the company’s performance; and it needs to change. 
low-cost production of commodities is no longer enough; it needs 
to move up the chain of value-added and to do so needs to use 
a range of business services in logistics, production and quality 
control. But if the markets for these services are not working well, 
if supply is limited or Rahim’s managers don’t see the need to 
invest in them, the company’s competitiveness will be threatened 
and jobs may go – including Rahim’s.
As a struggling small enterprise-owner, Sam is subject to a broad 
range of the economy’s problems. Inappropriate regulations 
mean that he can’t use his ownership of property and land to 
access finance – land markets are not working. He can’t pursue 
a major debtor because commercial justice services are not 
OvERvIEW
A Synthesis of the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
r
working. And he can’t bridge the gap dividing his small business 
from other larger businesses because the formal and informal 
means of business exchange – networks, standards, information 
– have passed him by.
Addressing the underlying reasons why market systems – such as 
those around Jyoti, Rahim and Sam – are not working well is at 
the heart of the market development or making markets work 














































M4P is an overarching approach to development that provides 
agencies and governments with the direction required to 
achieve large-scale, sustainable change in different contexts. 
Focused on the underlying constraints that prevent the effective 
development of market systems around poor people.
M4P contains: 
l A strategic rationale.
l A framework for understanding market systems.
l guidance for intervention. 
M4P is neither a narrow prescription nor a branded tool 
but a flexible, comprehensive approach with application in 
both economic (eg agriculture, finance, investment climate 
and livelihoods) and social (eg water, health and education) 
fields. Building on a wide range of experience and learning, 
it recognises both the achievements and limitations of many 
conventional approaches and the growing number of diverse, 
successful applications of M4P. 
For people like Jyoti, Rahim and Sam, M4P in practice might 
mean a range of interventions. It might mean strengthening the 
capacity and incentives of suppliers and retailers to provide 
farmers, like Jyoti, with relevant information so they too can 
be valued participants in the agricultural system. And it might 
mean developing health and education provision that is more 
responsive to the demands of rural households. For Rahim, 
M4P might mean actions that tackle the core reasons for the 
low level of business services. While for Sam, facing multiple 
challenges, actions might concentrate on flaws in regulation and 
enforcement that undermine the land and finance markets and 
the commercial justice system. Or on the ‘softer’ constraints 
related to business networks and lack of representation for the 
thousands of emerging but disconnected entrepreneurs like 
Sam. In each case, M4P offers potentially practical and lasting 
solutions. 
M4P is now being successfully used to reach and change the 
lives of millions of people. Its potential to reach many more 
– more Jyotis, Rahims and Sams – and to bring about sustained, 
systemic change for more competitive and inclusive economies 
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the paper and how to read it
This paper seeks to explain the essence of M4P – its rationale, its 
key principles and features and the main implementation tasks. It 
is aimed at a broad audience for whom M4P is relevant – policy 
makers, agency officials, consultants, NgOs, researchers and 
government staff – and provides a brief synthesis of the main 
evidence and arguments for the approach. Its purpose is to:
l Summarise key trends and issues in M4P.
l Contribute to new thinking and more effective practice.
l Provide an introduction to a series of connected documents 
 on M4P.
It is structured in four sections. It can be read as one document 
or readers can go directly to the section which is most relevant 
for their needs. Each section can therefore be been seen as an 
integral part of the paper as a whole or read as a self-contained 
document.
section
1. Market systems matter for the poor
The two principal background factors that have influenced development agencies and 
governments to pursue M4P. First, the observed reality of the poor in market systems, 
and second, new conceptual thinking on how market systems function.
2. Why M4P?
How the specific arguments for the approach emerged from development experience. 
It focuses first on similar learning from different fields and second on examples of M4P 
success. Together these make the case for M4P.
3. What is M4P?
The key features of M4P, highlighting what is distinctive about the approach. These 
include its focus on market systems, the priority it gives to sustainability and large-scale 
impact, the facilitation role required in intervention and M4P’s overarching nature as an 
approach within which many tools can be used.
4. How to implement M4P?
The main components in the M4P intervention process. An outline of key considerations 
in setting the strategic framework, understanding market systems, defining sustainable 
outcomes and acting to achieve systemic change.
go here for:
An overview of the ‘roots’ – real world 
and conceptual – of M4P.
The immediate factors driving agencies 
and governments to consider M4P – an 
organisational perspective.
A concise explanation of M4P and its key 
characteristics.
A summary of how to put M4P into 
practice.
This Synthesis paper is the first in a series of three documents that examine and explain M4P.  The M4P Perspectives contain a 
set of specific analyses of key issues in particular market systems (such as finance, agriculture, and water) and of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the approach. In addition, the M4P Operational Guide builds on the outline given in Section 4 and presents the 
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1. MARKET SySTEMS MATTER FOR THE POOR
SUMMARy the underlying rationale for the M4P approach stems from 
a new appreciation of the importance and role of market 
systems in reducing poverty.
economic growth (the most important contributor to 
poverty reduction) and expanded access are critical factors 
in developing competitive and inclusive economies. these, in 
turn, require:
l Markets for goods, services and commodities that operate 
 effectively for everyone but especially the poor as consumers, 
 producers or employees.
l Basic services – for example such as education, health 
 and water – that can build people’s capacities to escape 
 poverty.
Markets and basic services are traditionally regarded as very 
different.	The	first	is	seen	as	being	commercial	and	the	domain	
of private providers and the second primarily the domain of 
government. however, recent trends and major changes in 
economic thinking have allowed a more nuanced and realistic 
view to emerge which recognises that they have common 
characteristics.
Both are multi-functional; they require a mixture of different 
functions to be undertaken such as regulation, information 
and delivery.  Both are multi-player; they require a range of 
public and private players. in both, appropriate incentives and 
capacities are central to success.
the term market system describes these shared features 
of markets and basic services and provides a common lens 
through which both can be viewed. 
changing the lives of the poor – stimulating growth and 
expanding access – means changing the market systems around 
them.  M4P recognises this reality and provides a coherent 
and	unified	approach	first	to	understanding	and	second	acting	
to improve market systems.
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1.1 introduction
Two sets of key factors provide the underlying rationale for 
the M4P approach. First is the observed reality of the poor 
in market systems and the need therefore to understand 
and influence those systems. Second, in support of this, are 
the conceptual foundations for M4P, particularly changes in 
economic thinking. Both of these factors have brought new 
insight into the importance of market systems and the way 
in which they function and interact with the poor – and have 
major implications for agencies and governments, shaping both 
their policies and actions. 
1.2 Understanding the poor in market systems
The eradication of poverty remains the main goal of the 
international development community and against it the world 
has experienced mixed fortunes in the last two decades. globally, 
the number of people with incomes below $1 a day has fallen 
to below 1 billion (18% of the population) with spectacular 
reductions in many countries.1 This progress is mirrored in the 
general health, education and other benefits associated with 
higher incomes.
But this aggregate picture disguises considerable diversity. 
Reductions in some regions (such as East Asia where poverty 
rates are now only 9% of the population) are countered by the 
rise in numbers elsewhere (Africa remains at 41%). While global 
inequality (ie between countries) has reduced, within most 
countries it has increased. Changing the definition of poverty 
to an income of $2 a day places 2.5 billion people, almost half 
the world’s population, under the poverty line – a figure that 
has changed little in two decades. Other analyses refer to 4 
billion people on low incomes at the base of the “economic 
pyramid’’ .2 Self-evidently, many people are still poor, subject to 
the vulnerabilities of low incomes and largely excluded from the 
benefits that others enjoy.
Why growth and access are important
The central challenge for development agencies and 
governments is to learn from this disparate experience and 
create an environment that allows more people to build their 
capacities and assets, earn higher incomes and take advantage 
of opportunities to escape from poverty.  Such an environment 
has to deliver two critical features: growth and access.
Growth – economic growth is the single biggest contributor to 
poverty reduction.3 Regions that have experienced the highest 
growth rates have seen the highest falls in poverty. For example, 
the halving of poverty in vietnam between 1993 and 2002 – 
from 58% to 29% – was fuelled by annual growth rates of 6%.4 
Overall, at least 80% of the variation between countries’ poverty 
reduction performance is attributable to differences in growth.5 
This straightforward message – that growth is good for all, 
including the poor – does not mean that all types of growth 
are the same. In some latin American countries the poor, while 
still benefiting from growth, have done so proportionately less 
than the average population.a But in many Asian countries the 
reverse has been true.6 growth that is pro-poor tends to be 
more labour intensive and/or circulates the benefits more 
effectively through public transfers. 
Access – poor people’s access to a range of basic services (Box 1) 
such as education, health and sanitation also has a strong 
influence on poverty reduction. Consumption of these services 
is related closely to economic growth.7 As incomes rise, 
individuals and societies often choose to use this new freedom 
to invest in services such as education, health and telecommu-
nications. growth can generate a ‘virtuous circle’ of opportunity 
and prosperity, where higher incomes leads to a healthier and 
more educated population, building capacity to take advantage 
of opportunities and contribute to future growth.8
But if growth and access are mutually reinforcing, access is not 
simply a formulaic result of higher growth. The Indian states of 
Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, for example, have similar levels of 
gDP but Kerala has far superior health and education services, 
with neo-natal service coverage four times higher and female 
school enrolment rates 50% higher than in Uttar Pradesh.9 
Higher incomes do not always translate into better access to 
services. How services are offered – the mechanisms, incentives 
and relationships that guide delivery – may be as important as 
the amount of resources (how much) devoted to them.
given this, what are the characteristics of an environment that 
delivers growth and access to poor people? At one level there is 
broad consensus on this: an environment conducive to poverty 
reduction will offer overall macro-economic stability, access to 
international trade, security and rule of law, effective voice for 
the poor to decision-makers and transparent property rights – 
the central tenets of mainstream economic thinking. But beyond 
this, it must also provide markets and basic services that work 
for the poor. 
Why markets matter for the poor
Markets are arrangements through which buyers and sellers 
exchange goods and services and are the central organising 
principle at the heart of successful economies. Markets stimulate 
choice and competition so that producers are continually 
pressured to improve their efficiency and products and, in doing 
so, offer better value to more consumers. When set within 
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rb The Stern Report into the economics of climate change characterised it as the “greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen’’.
an appropriate framework of rules, functioning markets are a 
means through which both private and wider public gains are 
realised and are the basis for competitiveness and growth. 
Markets matter for everyone. But for the poor – with weaker 
informal networks and links to government patronage – 
markets are especially important. They provide the direct means 
through which the poor participate in economic activity – as 
producers (farmers, business owners), as employees (providers 
of labour) and as consumers (of goods and services). Markets 
operating in an inclusive way offer the poor the things they 
need – jobs, opportunities, goods, services – to increase their 
incomes. Conversely, where markets are working exclusively or 
inefficiently, poor people have fewer chances to benefit directly 
from growth. Indirectly, even if the poor are not immediately 
involved, markets such as those for services and the factor 
markets of land, labour and capital, affect the whole economy 
and the poor within it.
Whether direct or indirect, the sometimes complex ways in 
which markets function shape the environment of the poor. 
Access to land for example is always a critical issue in agriculture 
and is often problematic. In China and vietnam, changing the 
rules governing the use of land – allowing farmers to take de 
facto title – altered incentive structures and stimulated major 
increases in output (7% per annum in China) and productivity. 10 11 
In many African countries, however, traditional land ownership 
patterns and the social norms around them, especially for 
women, provide few incentives for investment. 
This weakness in the operation of land markets may be worsened 
by other market flaws. In Rwanda, agriculture is intensive but farmers 
have little access to information about good practices, seeds or 
other inputs. Consequently productivity is low – one-third that 
of ghana.12 People work hard in Rwanda but their environment 
does not allow them to work ‘smart’. In contrast, farmers in other 
countries, such as Bangladesh, are better served by a network of 
input suppliers who provide information and advice as well as new 
seeds and fertiliser – and here productivity is rising. 
More widely in Africa the absence of developed market 
structures such as commodity exchanges13 – which offer pooling 
mechanisms to reduce price volatility – means that farmers 
are especially vulnerable to ruinous boom and bust cycles. For 
example, record grain harvests for Ethiopian farmers in 2001 
were followed by a disastrous (80%) price collapse in 2002.14
Absence of information – about prices, trends, contacts – is 
a key constraint for the poor in markets where, characteristi-
cally, they have less ‘know-how’ and ‘know-who’ than those with 
more resources. However, information flow in rural areas has 
been greatly improved by better functioning markets. More than 
one-fifth of Africans now subscribe to a mobile phone service 
offered by private providers within an environment set by public 
regulators.15 And newly-permitted private media, especially 
radio, are now the main information source for rural people in 
many countries.16
The main asset of the poor, however, is not land, but labour, and 
it is labour productivity which has to grow if incomes are to 
rise. Some countries allow poor people to use this asset more 
than others. globally, the garment industry has often been the 
foundation for industrialisation and its starting point has been 
labour-intensive manufacture. Countries such as Bangladesh 
(2.2 million employees) and lesotho (50,000) have created 
labour conditions that attract investment and allow wages that, 
for women in particular (80% of the garment workforce), are 
higher than for comparable jobs.17 18 In others, such as South 
Africa and many East European countries, labour regulations 
render them high cost and unproductive locations.19
Whether countries can progress from cheap labour to higher 
value-added products, competing on quality, delivery and design 
depends critically on better functioning service markets. In 
middle-income economies such as those in South East Asia, 
specialised services – consulting, technology, transport and 
design – may not involve the poor directly but indirectly as 
interconnected markets are crucial for the competitiveness of 
the industry and for the livelihoods of those working in it.
Markets are always interconnected and the cause of one 
market’s weak performance frequently lies in related markets. 
As Hernando de Soto20 has highlighted, the operation of 
land and property markets is often central to the operation 
of other markets. For example, effective land markets provide 
the collateral basis to stimulate financial services; differences 
in national financial sector performance have been shown to 
account for approximately 20% of variances in overall growth 
rates.21 And the interconnection of markets is also evident in 
the environmental sphere where some potential solutions to 
addressing climate change centre on more effective marketsb 
– ranging from carbon markets to those for energy production 
technologies and conservation.22
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These examples show how markets can work efficiently for 
all and in particular in favour of the poor – but also how, in 
many situations, they don’t. They also illustrate that markets are 
pervasive and important parts of the poor’s socio-economic 
environment. As Amartya Sen23 notes, there’s little point being 
against markets per se. like breathing air, they’re there… 
the point is to make them work more effectively. 
M4P recognises this central fact – the ubiquity and importance 
of markets – and its clear consequence: poverty reduction 
requires that markets work better for the poor.
Basic services and the poor
A range of services are important in building people’s capacities to 
develop beyond poverty.  ‘Basic services’c  – where consumption 
serves not just an individual but impacts on the wider economy 
and society – are related most obviously to education, health, 
water and sanitation. However, basic services might also include 
new services of growing relevance in a changing economy such 
as mobile telephony, vocational training and basic finance. 
Fixed lines cannot be drawn easily around ‘basic’ services to 
distinguish them from others, like accounting for instance, which 
can be seen as within the domain of private markets (Box 1). 
But basic services can be distinguished by the strong externalities 
associated with them and, for some, their connection to human 
rights.d In this sense, basic services cannot simply be ‘left’: they 
are always a concern for and responsibility of governments.
For poor people, access to and use of these basic services is 
especially important since they are pivotal to strengthening 
capacity – which the poor characteristically lack – to take 
advantage of opportunities. yet, despite their importance, 
there are no fixed models of delivery that can claim to be 
best practice and define what a successful system looks like for 
providing basic services. Rather there are a range of experiences 
involving both private and public players from which common 
themes emerge. 
In relation to children’s education for example, direct 
government delivery has a mixed record. While some publicly-
delivered services are seen to be excellent (as in Singapore), 
for lower-income countries the record is often one of low 
standards, little accountability and weak provider motivation and 
competence. For the most remote and poorest areas, teachers 
are often simply not there. In India, for example, teachers’ 
absenteeism averages 25%.24 State-delivered education has 
become dysfunctional in many countries.
The weak state of children’s education is a key reason why 
wealthier people pay for private education. However, in a grow-
ing number of situations, poorer families are also abandoning 
government schools for private providers. One recent study 
covering India, ghana, Nigeria and Kenya found that a majority 
of residents in selected poorer slum areas used local, relatively 
low-cost private schools – and that the standards in these were 
higher than in their government counterparts.25
There are other examples which actively combine public and 
private players. In El Salvador, community-based schooling, 
supported financially by government and with accountability to 
parents and the community, has delivered higher enrolment and 
standards than conventional state schools.26
Innovations in water and sanitation services also revolve around 
a re-alignment of public and private roles. In some cases, blanket 
privatisation which has not understood the incentives and 
capacities of different players has not succeeded. However, in 
many other situations realignment of public and private roles 
has produced clear benefits. In latin America, for instance, a 
range of different models of public regulation and supervision 
and private provision have been used. 
Box 1
explaining ‘basic services’
Commonly-used terms can serve to confuse rather than clarify 
the nature of services. ‘Public’ and ‘private’ imply an unrealistically 
concrete distinction. By the normal definition (non-rival, 
non-excludable etc) there are very few genuine public goods 
or services. Services widely perceived to be public – such as 
water – provide direct (private) benefits to individuals as well as 
contributing to better public health and economic growth. 
On the other hand, services often seen to be ‘private’ including 
most business services such as mobile phones (although fixed 
lines are often seen as a public service) bring direct benefits for 
users but also serve a public purpose of reducing information 
and search costs in markets and therefore increasing economic 
efficiency. In both there are significant externalities.
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These have produced major growth in water connections (in 
Argentina these increased by 30% during the 1990s), with the 
largest gains for the poorest groups (Figure 1), and have achieved 
discernible reductions in child mortality.27 But this improvement 
stands in contrast to the overall picture of low and static access 
where the traditional subsidies given to existing consumers 
exclude those who are not connected (the poor).  And the poor 
commonly only have access to unsafe and expensive services; 
buyers of door-to-door water in Africa typically pay between 
three to ten times more than tap-connected users.
There are similar issues in the relationship between public and 
private roles in the more complex world of health and nutrition. 
Here, services include those aimed at individuals (personal 
treatment) and the wider population (immunisation, public 
health messages). The wider experience with public delivery 
in low-income economies is mixed. In some countries, such as 
Cuba, Malaysia and Sri lanka – it has been relatively successful. 
However, poorly motivated staff (absenteeism in public health 
facilities in Bangladesh averages 35%), low capacity and poor 
performance are more common. In most cases, the reality is a 
‘messy’ pluralist, public and private, health sector.  This poses new 
challenges for public policy such as more appropriate regulatory 
arrangements and the state as a purchaser of services – rather 
than continued pursuit of a unitary centralised system.
Promising new initiatives have sought to, among other changes, 
place the management of services in community hands (as in 
Benin, guinea and Mali28) and, by requiring co-payment from 
users, make providers more accountable to them (as in Mexico29). 
But this kind of successful re-alignment of roles between public 
and private players is still rare. And some reforms produce 
negative results; for example, as a consequence of reforms, 
heath workers in China have been encouraged to sell excessive 
drugs in order to earn higher incomes.30
These examples, covering a diverse range of basic services, 
illustrate that the poor can be reached, but often aren’t. learning 
from these trends, M4P recognises that successful approaches 
often involve a realignment of public and private players guided 
by a better understanding of incentives and capacities.
from markets and basic services to market systems
Countries where markets and basic services work effectively 
in favour of the poor offer the most conducive environment 
for poverty reduction. At first sight, markets and basic services 
might seem to be entirely different, one being commercial, 
payment-based and offered by private providers and the other 
with public organisations in prominent roles. Closer inspection, 
however, shows that they share a number of features (Box 2):
Multi-player 
In both cases, the mixture of different functions necessary for an 
effective system requires a range of private and public players 
(such as private firms, government departments, membership 
organisations and academic groups). ‘Public’ services are never 
entirely public, and ‘private’ markets never entirely private. 
figure 1
growth in water connections following private sector 
participation
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Multi-function 
Traditional centralised systems of service delivery, with some 
exceptions, are often failing. The reality is pluralistic or hybrid 
systems and the challenge is to make such systems work better. 
Similarly, markets (for land, labour, products, commodities etc) 
often don’t work because public roles – regulation, information, 
access to research – are not undertaken properly.
Built around incentives and capacities
Successful change in both markets and basic services is based 
around developing the technical capacities of different players 
and aligning better their incentives and motivations. Such 
incentives might well be sharpened through changing formal 
rules or the informal norms which often connect directly to the 
lives of poor people. Especially important is to recognise the 
centrality of transactional relationships in successful systems.
The term ‘market system’ used throughout this paper describes 
these shared characteristics of markets and basic services. 
M4P recognises this common ground and provides a basis for 
a coherent, unified approach to first understanding and then 
acting to improve market systems.
Box 2
the common ground of markets and basic services
While there might appear to be little in common between a 
market such as food products and a basic service such as water, 
closer analysis shows that they exhibit similar characteristics. 
In each, in order for the ‘core’ activity (the production and 
consumption of food and water) to be successful, other 
functions (such as regulation, information, training and research) 
need to be performed by different players – and they need to 
have sufficient capacity and incentives to do so.
In food markets, the direct product flow is likely to be a series 
of commercial links between private sector players (grower to 
processor to retailer to consumer etc). These are governed by an 
increasingly complex set of rules. Some are national regulations 
on food safety and environmental protection set and enforced 
by governments. Others are quality standards set by supra-
national non-profit bodies with certification done by private 
providers. Training and consulting to companies is also usually 
the domain of the private sector but this may be influenced by 
advice and information from research bodies and associations. 
Associations’ primary role however is likely to be advocacy to 
government and international bodies.
A basic service such as water might involve a variety of different 
arrangements. If provision is by the private sector (or a not-for-
profit association), a range of other tasks will be required largely 
from public bodies, including supervision and coordination, 
target setting, performance monitoring, testing and inspection. 
Consumer information might be provided through an industry 
association which might also set performance standards. 
Specialised technical support services would lie with the private 
sector. And a water consumers group might be necessary to 
ensure better provider accountability. 
The point here is not the precise make-up of each, which may be 
different from one context to another. Rather it is to recognise 
that both markets and basic services can be viewed through the 
same market system lens and that M4P is relevant to both.
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1.3 emerging conceptual thinking on market systems
Accompanying this new realisation of the position of the poor 
within market systems has been new analysis on the nature 
and role of markets. Much of this recognises the limitations 
of conventional economic thinking and the need to better 
understand how people behave within market systems. This 
new thinking on market systems has implications for agencies 
and governments.e 
In conventional economics, markets are seen to be the means 
through which resources are allocated. When operating under 
conditions of perfect competition and perfect information, 
rational market players respond to price signals (and these 
alone) and this price-regulated, money-based cash (or spot) 
exchange ensures efficiency and delivers growth. 
Of course, the assumptions underpinning this view of markets 
often do not apply.  Markets are prone to a number of well-
known imperfections (or failures). Asymmetric information 
– when suppliers know more than consumers and vice versa 
– can lead to under- or over-supply of particular goods. 
Externalities (either negative or positive) exist when the 
production or consumption of a good has spill-over affects that 
are not reflected in the market price. And public goods are 
those which are non-rival and non-excludable and therefore 
cannot be offered by private firms. 
So, one problem with conventional economic thinking is that the 
central framework for analysing markets is a theoretical abstract 
that tends to assume away inconvenient facts and is not likely 
to provide useful guidance for policy-makers. Blunt analysis of 
problems can lead to equally blunt actions.
Two other types of exchange are recognised in economics, 
outside of the theoretical idyll of the spot market. gift exchange 
is based around shared values and reciprocity, exchange is non-
financial and based on mutual obligations – and this obviously 
may be especially important for poorer people. Hierarchies 
occur where one party has relatively more power, and is able to 
exercise more command and control. large firms, for example, 
can dictate terms and control information flow to smaller 
suppliers.31 
Economics therefore identifies different types of exchange – 
market, gift and hierarchy – all of which may be relevant for 
poor people. But the problem with this, as guidance to policy 
makers, is that the distinction between the three categories is 
forced and artificial. In reality, all three types of exchange often 
co-exist and the boundaries between them are blurred and 
shifting32 (Box 3).
These weaknesses undermine the usefulness of conventional 
analysis in providing a cohesive platform for analysis and action. 
They also highlight the need for a more practical and holistic 
framework to guide agencies and governments. Emerging 
thinking from a number of different perspectives (such as 
behavioural and new institutional economics33) has sought to 
offer this framework. 
Most important here are the related concepts of transactions 
costs and institutions. In a perfect economic world it is assumed 
that there are no costs to exchange between buyers and 
sellers. In the real world however, buyers and sellers often 
lack information, lack trust or are physically separated, erecting 
barriers to exchange which then take resources to overcome 
(these are known as transactions costs). More efficient markets 
find ways of dealing with these costs, through mechanisms for 
defraying risk, making information available, maintaining and 
enforcing standards, and protecting consumers (these are 
known as institutions). 
Box 3 
Different types of exchange in a market system
The maize market in Bangladesh has been growing, driven 
by booming demand from the poultry feed industry. The 
functioning of the maize market system and the distribution of 
its benefits is based around different types of exchange. Maize 
farmers sell to buyers either for cash or promise of payment. 
Farmers themselves increasingly operate in hierarchical contract 
farming arrangements where a lead (large) farmer provides 
inputs, advice and finance to a large number of contractors in 
return for all their maize output at a fixed price. 
In general lead firms prefer to deal with larger rather than smaller 
farms since this reduces their transaction costs. Other than some 
employment gains, this preference has raised concerns over 
how the smallest farmers and the landless benefit directly from 
maize. In practice, however, benefits stem from the informal, 
patron-client-based relationships common in rural Bangladesh. 
Contract farmers, informally, often sub-contract production 
to smaller farmers using a variety of risk and income-sharing 
mechanisms. Such arrangements are outside (and disapproved 
of) by lead farmers but they are important in helping the poor 
participate directly in the market system.
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Transaction costs are a key indicator of the efficiency of a market 
and are, to a considerable extent, a function of institutional 
development. The burden of transaction costs tends to fall 
disproportionately on the poor.  For example, a bank, supported 
by regulations and knowing how these work, will pursue an 
unpaid debt – a fact which the debtor is aware of.  In contrast, 
a poor producer doesn’t know about the relevant regulations 
and cannot afford to go to court to recover unpaid debts – a 
fact his/her debtor is very aware of. 
Transaction costs and institutional development apply not just 
to the monetary exchange within commercial markets but also 
to other types of exchange. For example, schools are more 
likely to be effective when teachers feel accountable (formally 
or informally) to parents and pupils. And information flow 
between players in a value chain is more effective when built 
upon trust.
Inherent within transaction costs is stronger recognition of the 
role and nature of incentives in market systems. In particular, 
people’s motivations and behaviour are not seen simply as a 
function of prices but are shaped by a range of factors, both 
formal and informal. For example, while the leasing of land is 
permitted in Ethiopia and should provide opportunities for 
investment, informally, a widespread perception of tenure 
insecurity undermines farmers’ incentives to do so.34
These trends in economic thinking have a number of implications 
for agencies and governments: 
l Different types of exchange – monetary and non-monetary 
 – are intertwined and are all subject to transaction costs and 
 institutional development. Separating these into artificial 
 boxes of analysis is neither practical nor aids clarity.  They need 
 to be brought within the same conceptual framework – 
 market systems.
l Analysis and understanding needs to reflect a more nuanced 
 view of how markets operate. Seeing exchange (supply 
 and demand) as the only function in markets is simplistic and 
 inaccurate, missing the important functions related to rules 
 (formal and informal) and information where the underlying 
 determinants of market performance are often to be found. 
l Since institutions are human-created, evolution towards more 
 efficient and inclusive markets is not inevitable. Market systems 
 (and countries) can become stuck in paths of under- 
 development and poverty, reflecting the vested interests of 
 powerful groups. However, more positively, the ‘rules of the 
 game’ that shape behaviour can be understood, influenced 
 and changed through purposeful, focused action. It is this that 
 offers opportunity for agencies and governments.
l The validity of the narrow prescriptions for government 
 action which are generated by inaccurate analyses is called into 
 question. For example, services are often incorrectly labelled 
 ‘public goods’ (there are very few public goods in reality) and 
 this designation used as a carte blanche justification for direct 
 state provision with little consideration of other options (such 
 as regulation, research and information) that may actually be 
 more useful in promoting access (Box 435).
M4P builds on these recent trends in conceptual analysis to 
establish a common framework that recognises exchange in 
different forms, the mixture of functions and players and the 
incentives and rules within market systems. More importantly, 
M4P seeks to go beyond the conceptual analysis of markets. 
Increasingly, as Section 2 shows, the evidence of M4P in practice 
is that it provides a useful framework not just to understand the 
world but to act to change it significantly .f
Box 4 
from analysis to actions in aquaculture
In aquaculture, up-to-date information is recognised as important 
to promote new ideas and practices. Often this is seen as a 
public good which should be provided through government 
extension services. However, in Bangladesh, a more nuanced 
analysis recognised that:
l Extension service officers had few incentives for good 
 performance and a dysfunctional working culture prevailed. 
l Private input suppliers (such as nurseries) had a commercial 
 incentive to provide useful advice to farmers as a means of 
 improving their performance and of differentiating what they 
 did from their competitors.
Intervention built on this analysis and improved information 
flows through private players with subsequent improvements 
in productivity.





adopt M4P stem from two factors:
l Learning from a range of development experiences on what 
 works (and what doesn’t).
l the success of M4P in practice.
first, across a range of different development experiences and 
fields	–	from	agriculture	and	finance	to	water	and	sanitation	 
and health – similar conclusions have been drawn. Many efforts 
at direct intervention and distant reform have failed – achieving 
limited outreach, impact and sustainability, and distorting rather 
than developing markets. 
Learning from these experiences indicates that agencies and 
governments need to ground what they do in the reality of 
market systems and focus on stimulating systemic change.
second, from different sources, there is growing evidence 
that M4P works. Major programmes, in different contexts 
and markets systems explicitly using the M4P approach and 
governments	and	agencies	 influenced	by	 its	key	tenets,	have	
achieved	significant	change.
change is manifested in high levels of outreach and impact 
–	for	example,	the	number	of	people	accessing	and	benefitting	
from new services. More important, in each case, capacities 
and incentives have been developed to show that change is 
sustainable and therefore impact will grow further in the 
future. 
M4P is not a panacea and there are still areas of debate over its 
application. nonetheless, taken together, these factors highlight 
the value of the approach in addressing misconceptions of 
market systems, introducing a more positive (yet realistic) view 
of their role, and setting out how to realise their potential for 
all – and for the poor in particular.
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The immediate rationale for the M4P approach for agencies 
and governments is provided by two factors. Building on wider 
trends – the importance of market systems and changes in 
conceptual thinking accompanying this – these relate to specific 
experiences of organisations. First is their experience in different 
fields and the common learning to emerge from these: the need 
to adopt a new approach focused on systemic change. Second 
are the achievements of M4P in practice and the evidence that, 
as an approach, it can deliver substantial, sustainable impact. 
While there are some outstanding issues in relation to the poor 
and market systems where there is still much debate, these 
factors together help make the case for M4P.
2.2 the wider development experience 
The direct experience of development agencies and governments 
whose policies and resources impact on the development of 
market systems and the poor is often the most powerful driver 
of change. What has been their experience and what can be 
learned that might help to guide future actions? 
One of the distinctive features of M4P is that its origins lie 
in a broad range of development fields where poor people 
interact with market systems. These include agriculture, finance, 
private sector development, water and health. Traditionally, each 
operates as a separate ‘box’ of activity, knowledge and models 
of practice – with little cross-over learning between them. 
However, despite their difference, the experience of each and 
the parallel learning processes they have spawned have reached 
remarkably similar conclusions. M4P grows from the common 
experience in these fields. generalising (and simplifying), this can 
be presented as a continuum with, at either end, two contrasting 
perspectives: impulsive intervention and remote reform.36
impulsive intervention
This first strand of development practice has been concerned 
with intervening directly to ‘get things done’. Here, the essence 
of the approach is that, if the market system isn’t delivering well, 
‘we’ (agencies and governments) should replace it and provide 
finance, advice, materials, services… whatever is required, 
directly. We should do it ourselves to ‘get on with the job’.
Interveners emphasise their ‘hands-on’ business-like ethos and 
– impatient with the perceived inaction of others – see their 
approach as practical, a tangible means of generating ‘quick-
wins’. For governments, the interveners’ impulse manifests 
itself in direct delivery by them. For agencies, intervention may 
either mean delivery directly by them or, more commonly, 
working with partners (such as government or not-for-profit 
organisations) to deliver directed, subsidised services. 
After many years, with some exceptions, it is now clear that 
this has not been a hugely positive experience. Major reviews 
in different fields (Box 5) indicate that the results of these 
interventions have been characterised by37:
l  limited outreach – typically with a small proportion of potential 
 users being served.
l limited impact – with only patchy signs of positive change 
 and little evidence that directed support stimulates wider 
 development.
l limited sustainability – with the whole apparatus of ‘support’ 
 requiring continuous infusions of external resources.





intervening impulsively in business services
The perils of impulsive intervention have been exposed most 
notably in the business services (BDS) field – the swathe of 
non-financial services critical for business development. From 
the late-1990s onwards, BDS was the focus of an almost unique 
collaborative effort between agencies coordinated through the 
Donor Committee on Enterprise Development. The purpose 
was to explore agencies’ experience transparently so that the 
learning curve would be ‘cleaner’, more widely accepted and 
more effective.
The message from this process was that: 
l Direct support to business was usually ineffective, producing 
 few benefits. 
l The horizon of sustainability only lasted as long as the 
 external subsidy.
l The core task of agencies should be to facilitate markets for 
 BDS, not to subsidise delivery directly and continually.
The outputs from this process have influenced practice 
significantly. Of course, there are examples of agencies that do 
intervene in a direct manner. But at least the challenge for them 
is laid out more clearly: how to ensure that they develop rather 
than distort incentives and the process of longer-term change 
and development. 
g As seen in the statements from the 2004 gathering of leading economists – the Barcelona Consensus.
A Synthesis of the Making Markets Work for the Poor (M4P) Approach
r
Why has this happened? Overall, the interveners’ experience has 
been undermined by two inadequacies. First has been a failure 
to question the roles of key players given their competence and 
incentives; ie to consider the key issues of who does what and 
why in a market system. This factor is especially the case where 
governments have drifted into roles which are inappropriate 
and unsustainable – often persisting to just play a direct delivery 
role and neglecting the wider system of which they are a part. 
So, rather than considering what role they could best play in the 
overall system and “move away from a market versus state optique 
and work from existing realities”38, governments have stuck to the 
conventional (and often ineffectual), for example, in fields such 
as agriculture extension, vocational training and health. 
Second, especially in economic fields, there has been a failure to 
place businesses in a market context. The interveners’ instinct 
has been to ask the question “what problems do businesses have 
and how can I solve them?” and not to ask the more relevant 
systemic questions: “why isn’t the market environment providing 
solutions?” to these and “How can I address the constraints that 
prevent it from effectively doing so?” Improving the functioning 
of market systems and addressing the underlying causes shaping 
business behaviour have not been priorities. logically, if the 
right questions are not asked the right approaches are unlikely 
to emerge. The conclusions reached in a recent review of EC 
private sector development programmes (1994-2003) could 
apply to many agencies39:
“EC programmes often focused on the direct provision of services 
for immediate impact, rather than addressing the constraints 
that preclude correct functioning of the market. [As a result] PSD 
activities are not designed so as to improve the competitiveness of 
the private sector in a sustainable manner”.
remote reform
The prevailing views of the development world have shifted in 
recent years.40 At a macro-level, the key tenets of the mainstream 
‘market-friendly’ approach are relatively straightforward: fiscal 
discipline, low marginal taxes and a broader tax base, openness to 
trade and investment, and liberalising microeconomic reform. getting 
‘prices right’ in an economy is still seen to be critical in providing 
an overarching enabling environment conducive to development 
– and this is the key priority for governments. Now, however, there 
is recognition of the complexity of growth processes and the 
need to adapt approaches (to some degree) to different contexts. 
Prompting this revision is acknowledgement of the mixed experience 
of previous rigid, imposed approaches – with some countries 
succeeding in achieving strong growth and others (especially in Africa) 
palpably not. There is broad acceptance of the need to go beyond 
the previous policy mantra of “stabilise, privatise and liberalise”.g 
However, even if the most obvious examples of inappropriate, 
distant reform are fading, there are still many instances of 
unsuitable ‘solutions’ being imported to different contexts. For 
example, the comparative failure to establish effective stock 
exchanges in Africa appears, in part at least, to be attributable 
to the strong emphasis placed on ‘heavy’ regulatory and judicial 
regimes which are incongruent with local needs and capacities. 
And the current emphasis on enhancing the investment climate 
runs the risk of overlooking “the many industry-specific policy and 
enforcement issues which collectively have been found to be the 
most important constraints to growth”.41
Why has this happened? Two critical weaknesses have 
undermined the reformers’ efforts. First, there has been a 
failure to recognise the importance of informal rules and the 
complexity of institutional change processes. Achieving changes 
in laws and regulations – the formal ‘rules of the game’ – is of 
little use if enforcement practices are not also changed. Change 
processes have to be driven by key people within countries and 
based on an understanding of the political economy – especially 
the incentives of stakeholder groups. Change can seldom be 
decreed from outside.
Second, there has been a failure to recognise that an ‘environment 
that enables’ growth is more than the right regulations. It also 
includes, for example, information, appropriate services and 
levels of skills and knowledge – elements of a system which are 
as important as regulations. Other, more practical and holistic 
perspectives support this view:
l Michael Porter emphasises the importance of supporting 
 services, infrastructure and information in his ‘diamond’ of 
 factors that contribute to the microeconomic environment for 
 competitiveness.42
l Rodrik et al’s ‘growth diagnostics’ framework43 addresses the 
 ‘binding constraints’ in economies, based on decision-tree 
 analyses of cause and effect.
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It is the case that successful change in market systems may well 
require regulatory reform inspired by examples from elsewhere 
as well as active intervention. But remote reformers and 
impulsive interveners – both (slight) caricatures at either ends 
of a spectrumh 44 – represent real experiences. They are united 
by a common problem – namely a failure to ground what they 
do in market realities, in the way that market systems work 
and a clear vision of how they can work better. More positively, 
however, they are united by a common conviction that the 
lessons from these experiences can be learned, and that this 
learning is increasingly evident across different development 
spheres. For example:
l Business development services: “The objectives of outreach 
 and sustainability can only be achieved in well-developed 
 markets for business services” (International Donor Committee, 
 Blue Book).
l Financial services: “To achieve its full potential, microfinance 
 must become a fully integrated part of a developing country’s 
 mainstream financial system” (CgAP45).
l Health: “Key systemic reasons for suboptimal functioning of 
 health systems are…  disjointed engagement of the private 
 sector in delivering health care” (Spinaci et al46).
l land: “We need to move away from project-based thinking to 
 systemic approaches that lead to national roll out” (Augustinus 
 and Deininger47).
l Rural livelihoods: “A more imaginative approach is needed, 
 rooted in stronger understanding… of institutional develo- 
 pment in economic growth, with market development one part of 
 that institutional development” (Dorward et al).
l Agriculture: “The key requirement is to engage in ways that are 
 non-distorting, market-oriented and capable of generating net 
 benefits for the poor” (Joffe and Jones48).
M4P is the outcome of this hard learning.
2.3 M4P in practice
The final argument in support of M4P is the tangible evidence 
from its application in different contexts. A growing body 
of experience attests to the utility of M4P. In terms of the 
key challenges of growth and access, the central tasks for 
development agencies and governments, M4P is increasingly 
seen as a means of achieving large-scale and sustainable change. 
In short, M4P works. 
The most obvious examples of M4P working, of course, are 
where governments – without consciously using the label 
and largely unprompted by aid agencies – have successfully 
developed market systems. For example, while the global 
advance of mobile telephony is sometimes seen as a result 
of technological innovation only, the space for mobile phone 
providers to be effective has been created by a major strategic 
innovation in governments’ role. Instead of trying to be service 
deliverers (as they are often with fixed lines) they have shifted 
to a licensing and regulatory position. In doing so, they have 
created the competitive incentive and opportunity for providers 
to reach out to low-income groups and consumers in remote 
areas, and to develop new services. None of this would have 
occurred without a major realignment of roles in the market 
system. 
Alongside this kind of successful change instigated by 
governments, there are other more specific examples where 
agencies, acting with partners, and consciously following the 
M4P approach, have stimulated major change. The three cases 
of M4P in practice given here (Table 1) have been selected on 
the basis of their performance, because they have been subject 
to external review and because they represent a diversity of 
contexts and market systems – financial services in South Africa, 
mass media (radio) in Uganda and vegetables in Bangladesh.
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table 1
illustrating M4P in practice
 
finMark trust, south Africa
Context: low reach of financial services 
(initially 38%) among low-income groups, 
excludes them from the mainstream 
economy and restricts their contribution 
to growth.
Goal: to make financial services markets 
work more effectively for the poor.
Challenge: understanding and addressing 
a range of systemic constraints in a 
politicised and divided context.
Main activities: building a shared view of 
the industry’s future; supporting service 
innovation; developing information 
services; improving regulatory process; 
stimulating consumer education.
Achievements: contributing to 7.1m 
increase in ‘banked’ population; new 
information services; stronger public 
roles; better innovation environment.
fit-seMA, Uganda
Context: poor quality of business-related 
programming in radio services restricts 
information flow in the economy and 
limits accountability.
Goal: to improve the quality and relevance 
of commercial radio programming on a 
sustainable basis.
Challenge: changing the prevailing radio 
business model.
Main activities: work with small number 
of radio stations to improve programme 
innovation and quality; demonstrate 
‘business case, ‘crowd-in’ others; 
strengthen wider market functions 
(audience research, journalism etc).
Achievements: 25 stations offering 50 
new programmes and reaching 7m more 
listeners.
katalyst*, Bangladesh
Context: low productivity stemming 
from incorrect practices and use of 
inputs restricts the potential income, 
employment and nutrition effects of 
vegetable cultivation.
Goal: to improve the productivity of 
vegetable farming on a sustainable basis.
Challenge: building information and advice 
as embedded services in the value chain.
Main activities: provide support to input 
suppliers to develop a retailer training 
programme and so build retailers’ 
incentives and capacity to offer better 
advice to farmers.
Achievements: new business model in 
supply chain serving and improving 
performance among 1m farmers. 
*  Katalyst works in more than 20 different regional  
 sectors; vegetables is one of these.
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In each case, these projects have sought to pursue a different 
approach from ‘conventional practice’. For example:
l FinMark Trust49 (FinMark), rather than setting up a ‘provider for 
 the poor’ or changing isolated regulations, worked to address 
 the underlying causes of low access – information, innovation, 
 stakeholder relationships and regulatory processes.
l FIT-SEMA50 (Small Enterprise Media in Africa), rather than buying 
 airtime from radio stations to broadcast specific information, 
 worked to build the capacity and incentives of radio stations 
 and other players to improve programming.
l Katalyst51, rather than paying for the direct delivery of training 
 to farmers, worked initially with one (and then several) input 
 supply firms to build their capacity to offer training to retailers 
 so that they, in turn, would change their business offer to 
 farmers (provide better information and advice).
Each project has been operating for a number of years and 
some key achievements can now be identified. In relation to 
outreach, in each case, considerable scale has been achieved:
l In South Africa, the number of people with bank accounts 
 (Figure 2) has grown from 11.8 million (38% of the population) 
 to 19.0 million (60%) in a six-year period. FinMark has been 
 one among a number of influences but its contribution has 
 been critical.
l  In Uganda, there were no relevant programmes in 1999, but now 
 more than 25 radio stations are now serving 7 million listeners 
 with more than 50 different business-related programmes. 
l In Bangladesh, Katalyst’s work in the vegetable sector over a 
 three-year period has reached nearly 3,000 retailers serving a 
 farmer clientele of approximately 1 million farmers.
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In each case relatively large numbers of people have gained 
access to new services – but what is known of the final 
benefits they have accrued through these? In the case of fee-
based banking services, there is of course a difference between 
access to, use of and benefit from services. However, it can be 
assumed that people buy banking services because they offer 
value and so, in aggregate, rising coverage can be equated with 
consumer satisfaction. For radio in Uganda, case study evidence 
shows direct links between improvements in the incomes and 
livelihoods of thousands of poor producers and the extra voice 
and advocacy provided by radio that has resulted in rules being 
enforced, public promises enacted and corruption exposed.
Finally, case studies in Bangladesh show that overcoming this 
information barrier has typically brought productivity gains of 
20-30% in vegetable production thus helping to enhance the 
country’s competitiveness relative to its neighbours. Survey 
evidence indicates that total factor productivity in farmers who 
are clients of trained retailers is, on average one-quarter higher 
than those who are clients of other retailers. 
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For this increased scale and final impact to be genuinely 
meaningful, these need to be more than transient gains; they 
need to be enduring. In relation to sustainability, a range of 
changes have been stimulated which show that, not only are 
benefits likely to continue, but the capacity and incentives have 
been developed to suggest they will grow further.
l New commercial services – in FinMark, a new syndicated 
 information service (FinScope) has been developed and 
 operates on a commercial basis in South Africa. New support 
 services have also been created in Uganda – such as radio 
 journalist training – to allow continued improvement in 
 quality. 
l New public roles – in the financial services market in South 
 Africa, processes of regulatory reform as well as public functions 
 such as consumer financial literacy have been re-energised.
l New business models – in Katalyst and FIT-SEMA in particular, 
 market players see the value of different business models. 
 Radio stations have an incentive to provide better business- 
 focused programming since this will attract new listeners 
 and, in turn, more commercial sponsorship. Input suppliers and 
 retailers in Bangladesh have increased profits from following 
 a more information-rich business approach. They have an 
 incentive to continue to expand and deepen their work and 
 their competitors an incentive to emulate their achievements. 
l New relationships – inherent within these changes are more 
 mutually-beneficial relationships between market players, for 
 example, between radio stations and training organisations 
 and between input suppliers, retailers and farmers.
figure 2 






















i Without any mention of M4P per se.   
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How do these achievements compare with other interventions 
which have pursued a more directed, delivery route? Side-by-
side comparisons are not always possible and, by concentrating 
on headline indicators, can be misleading. However, the data 
suggest that the scale of outreach and impact evident in these 
examples is much higher than is normally seen. Nor has this 
enhanced performance been achieved simply by more external 
inputs (ie at the expense of efficiency). Again, while detailed 
comparisons are not available it is clear that the M4P approach 
is no more (and generally much less) expensive than more 
conventional project routes. For example, Katalyst’s work in 
vegetables cost around $120,000 over three to four years. 
FIT-SEMA’s total budget over a seven-year period was around 
$1.5 million.
Overall, however, the most significant feature of change in these 
examples is that it has been ‘systemic’ – it has addressed the 
underlying causes of ‘under-performance’ of the system as a 
whole and of poor people within it. FIT-SEMA’s work in Uganda 
offers a relevant comparison with other projects that, with similar 
objectives (improved information for small businesses), focused 
on directly buying air time from radio stations. While these 
initially achieved high outreach, they failed to bring about lasting 
change in the radio market. Indeed no donor-financed radio 
programme in Uganda has ever lasted beyond the duration of 
its initial funding (Figure 3). 
figure 3
stylised comparison of fit-seMA outreach versus a 
conventional project
These examples illustrate that, in different contexts and in 
different market systems, M4P works, offering greater and more 
lasting change than other conventional approaches. This is not to 
say however, that M4P should be regarded as a purist, jealously-
guarded brand. Indeed, in many other diverse situations, key 
dimensions of M4P have been incorporatedi with very positive 
results. For example, in Somalialand – in a context of conflict and 
near-collapse of central government – a successful collaboration 
between municipalities and the local private sector over water 
services has led to an eight-fold increase in connections, 
improved health in the community and higher revenues for 
the municipality.52 While in neighbouring Kenya, a project in the 
avocado and passion fruit value chains has focused successfully 
on the introduction and development of fee-based, commercial 
services – spraying, grafting, pruning – for small farmer groups, 
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2.4 caution and caveats
If it is clear that there are strong arguments for M4P,  it would be 
a mistake to see it as a doctrinaire panacea. There are many areas 
of legitimate debate over a range of issues and, in considering 
market systems and the poor, a number of questions which do 
not neatly fall into a simple, ‘good-bad’ distinction. 
Is the replacement of informal mechanisms of exchange with commercial 
services always good for the poor? 
Poor people often have developed arrangements, especially in relation 
to finance, through which resources are allocated and information 
and knowledge shared. These arrangements are set within social 
networks and relationships that may often discriminate against the 
poorest – and cement their ‘lowly’ position. But it is over-optimistic 
to assume from this that inclusion in commercial services will accord 
them equal and respected status as market players such as clients or 
producers.
Do the poor ‘win’ from market change?
Change is a recurring feature of market systems and processes of 
change are seldom smooth. Markets are competitive, with firms and 
individuals juxtaposed against each other. In this context, ‘the poor’ are 
not an homogenous group; they may well have conflicting interests 
such as producers versus consumers. Simply ‘stopping’ change is 
rarely a realistic option but neither is it straightforward to determine 
where and how the best interests of poor people (in aggregate) are 
served.
What should the role of government be?
In determining an appropriate role for government, institutional 
experience may provide conflicting evidence about what to do. 
government-controlled health services are excellent in Cuba but 
dysfunctional in many low-income countries. State-owned banks 
often have high numbers of poor people as bank account holders 
but does providing access equate with offering useful services? 
Is M4P consistent with rights-based obligations? 
Proponents of rights-based development argue that they create a 
moral and legal climate to force change. Critics see them as empty 
promises that fall into disrepute because they fail to consider how 
obligations will be met. It is often assumed that government will 
deliver directly: but if it can’t or won’t – and this is frequently the 
case – can a different government role be interpreted within a rights 
context?
Where does market development meet social protection?
Social protection, by definition, is different from development 
(dealing with symptoms not causes) but in practice the distinction 
is often blurred. Obviously, many of the poorest people in difficult 
circumstances need welfare but there are recognised dangers that 
over-dependence on welfare damages the incentives and self-reliance 
necessary for longer-term-development. 
These points highlight the need to tailor actions to local context and 
to think through in each circumstance how market systems impinge 
upon poor people. However, this does not undermine the validity 
and value of the approach in addressing misconceptions of market 
systems, introducing a more positive (yet realistic) view of their role 





3. WHAT IS M4P?
SUMMARy M4P is an approach to developing market systems so that 
they	function	more	effectively,	sustainably	and	beneficially	for	
poor people, building their capacities and offering them the 
opportunity to enhance their lives. Applicable to development 
agencies and governments working in both economic and 
social	fields,	it	is	an	approach	defined	by	a	number	of	important	
characteristics.
M4P is an approach to development that provides guidance 
not only on understanding of the poor in market systems 
(analysis) but on how to bring about effective change (action). 
Analysis should identify the underlying constraints impinging 
upon market systems and concentrate on addressing these.
its focus is on developing market systems, assessed with 
respect to different market functions and players, public and 
private, formal and informal. this systemic character of M4P 
defines	many	of	its	most	important	features.	
By addressing underlying causes (rather than symptoms) 
of weak performance, M4P aims to unleash large-scale 
change. interventions may be small in themselves, but should 
continually strive to leverage the actions of key market players 
to bring about extensive and deep-seated systemic change. 
sustainability is a prime concern of M4P.  this means conside- 
ring not just the existing alignment of key market functions 
and players but how they can work more effectively in the 
future, based on the incentives and capacities of players 
(government, private sector, associations etc) to play different 
roles.
M4P requires that agencies and governments play a facilitating 
role. As external players they seek to catalyse others in the 
market system (while not becoming part of it themselves). 
for governments, except where they are playing longer-term 
roles within the market system, and agencies, facilitation is 
inherently a temporary role.
finally, as an overarching framework M4P does not necessarily 
replace	other	specific	methodologies	and	tools	but	provides	
a transparent and multi-disciplinary framework within which 
they can be utilised and adapted in order to address their 
limitations	and	so	enhance	their	efficacy.
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3.1 introduction
M4P is an approach to developing market systems that benefit 
poor people, offering them the capacities and opportunities 
to enhance their lives. Building on a detailed understanding of 
market systems and a clear vision of the future, M4P allows 
agencies to address identified systemic constraints and bring 
about large-scale and sustainable change. 
However, beyond this rather generalised definition, there is 
less of a consensus over what M4P is – what its distinguishing 
features are – or what its ambition could be. From these early 
years of M4P experience, it is evident that establishing this 
clarity is important. On the one hand, M4P is an overarching 
approach with the potential to be applicable to a wide range 
of socio-economic development fields. It is not a specific, 
prescriptive tool. On the other hand, there is a welcoming 
wholesomeness to the term ‘making markets work for the 
poor’ which, since many development activities aimed at 
poverty reduction often involve some engagement with 
markets, leads to the mistaken view that everything, broadly, 
can be categorised as M4P.
This tendency to assume that breadth of approach and 
application equates with an ‘anything goes’ looseness in M4P 
interventions is problematic. M4P is shaped by a rigorous 
assessment process to guide action. While the approach will 
evolve, activities which are inconsistent with this are, logically, 
not M4P.  In order to avoid drift and confusion therefore it is 
important to be clear about what M4P is.
This section captures the defining and interrelated features of 
M4P related to its nature (an overarching approach combining 
analysis and action), its key areas of focus (market systems, 
scale, sustainability) and its implications for agencies and 
governments (the facilitation role).
3.2 M4P as an approach
M4P is an approach which means that it is both about analysing 
the poor in market systems and about providing guidance on 
how to act to bring about positive change. It is the combination 
of both of these elements – frameworks for analysis and for 
action – that makes M4P more than an interesting analytical tool 
(there are many of these) or a set of useful operational tips (and 
these). Its aim is to provide coherence and consistency in how 
we understand the world and, given this, how we intervene to 
bring about change.
It is primarily for those who are pursuing the public goal of 
poverty reduction – development agencies and governments 
chiefly – and who can do so through making market systems 
work more effectively and inclusively. While it may also be of 
interest to private companies, its primary audience is those 
who are trying to shape the market system rather than be 
participants in it.
M4P is an approach to promote systemic change – change 
that goes beyond individual players and that is relevant to the 
wider environment, affecting many. Indeed, many of the specific 
features which follow are concerned with giving meaning to 
what is meant by ‘systemic’.
3.3 A focus on market systems
The reason for M4P’s focus on market systems is clear. By 
bringing about change in the market systems within which 
people live and work it is possible to effect substantial and 
lasting change that can impact on many sustainably rather than 
a few temporarily. learning from past experiences has logically 
taken the development community to an emphasis on systemic 
change. 
What is less clear is what is meant by a ‘market system’? The 
composition and structure of specific market systems varies 
greatly with context. The market system for small business 
finance in a middle-income country will obviously look and feel 
very different from the water and sanitation services market in 
an urban slum. Markets for land, labour, raw materials, capital, 
goods and services are all different but they share the same 
key elements. In practice, all market systems can be viewed 
through the same lens consisting of different sets of functions 
and players (Figure 4).
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figure 4 
stylised view of the market system
The core function in any market system is to provide a space 
for transactions of a good or service. However the nature and 
efficiency of the core is shaped by formal and informal rules and 
a range of supporting functions.  These determine behaviour 
and practices, shape relationships, and provide information, 
knowledge and incentives. Within this environment, a diverse 
range of public and private, formal and informal players may be 
active. It is this multi-function, multiple player arrangement that 
M4P refers to as a market system. 
In any market system, there are three main sets of functions 
– core, rules and supporting functions. 
Core
This is the central set of exchanges between providers (the 
supply-side) and consumers (demand-side) of goods and 
services at the heart of any market. Exchange is conventionally 
through money, but can be through non-financial accountability 
(say in government-provided services) or through informal quid 
pro quo arrangements (in social or business networks). In most 
market systems, the private sector can be seen to be the main 
provider.
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j Self-evidently, supporting functions – such as vocational training – are often market systems in their own right.  
Box 6
change throughout the market system in south Africa
The growth and greater inclusiveness of financial services in 
South Africa (the core) can be clearly attributed to changes in 
supporting functions and rules. 
Although there has been some regulatory change, more 
important has been the wider social and political shift which 
has influenced banks’ incentives and provided a spur for 
innovation and cooperation. New commercial information 








raw material for product development. Consumer education 
has been pursued more vigorously by public and private players. 
Extending financial services to the ‘unbanked’ population has 
become recognised as a collective responsibility of the banks. 
In other words, achievements in the core of the market system 
are explained in relation to change stimulated in the market’s 
supporting functions.
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Rules
These act to shape market outcomes and govern participation 
and behaviour in markets. Rules include informal rules or 
norms, formal rules or laws and other standards and codes of 
practice. Formal providers of rules are commonly governments 
or membership organisations. Rules are essentially a non-
commercial or public or collective role in markets. However, 
their enforcement (often the most problematic issue) can 
involve private sector players (for example, in international food 
quality standards). Informal rules are generally a product of local 
culture and value systems and practices and invariably define 
the extent to which formal rules are accepted.
Supporting functions
A range of other functions support the core exchange and 
help the market to develop and grow including, for example, 
consultation processes; research and development (R&D); 
information; and capacity development and co-ordination. 
The nature of these, and who provides them, varies from one 
context to another. labour markets, for instance, may require 
information on market trends, vacancies, available skills levels 
and the legal framework – which is often best provided by 
government. Employment agencies linking supply and demand 
might be best provided by the private sector, while training 
is likely to involve both public and private organisationsj. 
Coordination in specific skills and disciplines is always likely to 
involve government and business or professional associations.
For governments and agencies, intervening to bring about 
change throughout a market system usually involves addressing 
rules and supporting functions (Box 6). 
Two other factors need to be recognised. First, all three 
dimensions in a market system – core, rules and supporting 
functions – can be seen in an international, national or local 
context. It is an approach which is adaptable to different contexts 
and different resources, although more fundamental change will 
often require looking beyond the local environment. Second, by 
their nature, the influence of factor markets – even if they are not 
the core market under consideration – is pervasive. Obviously 
change here can result in widespread impact54, although it is 
often relatively more difficult to bring about.
3.4 Leveraging scale and impact
M4P is concerned with achieving large-scale change. Of course, 
all agencies and all governments avow the same ambition but 
M4P can claim legitimately to be an approach that is inherently 
about stimulating large-scale change. By focusing on systems, 
M4P is seeking to go beyond individual organisations and 
groups, to consider how the wider system can be enhanced to 
influence many. 
Two notable implications flow from this concern with scale. First, 
M4P projects need to think continually about how to go beyond 
their immediate context, to leverage greater change. For example, 
interventions that work with only one partner – and stop there 
– without considering how the experience can be used to bring 
in others or hoping that an (often ill-defined) demonstration effect 
will somehow happen need to reconsider their approach (Box 755). 
The age-old criticism of development projects – that they are small 
and scattered, interesting perhaps but adding up to very little (the ‘so 
what?’ question) – is confronted directly in M4P by a requirement 
to consider from the outset how resources will promote large-
scale change.




Recent years have seen increased interest from agencies 
in supporting large companies directly. Some of these 
collaborations – sometimes done under the auspices of public 
private partnerships (PPPs) – have resulted in successful 
innovations. large-scale impact appears to be more easily 
achievable by working with large firms – especially reaching out 
to low-income consumers.
yet, beyond the immediate outreach achieved, the rationale for 
and long-term effects of this support are less clear. Risk-taking 
innovation is the essence of business. Financing single (large) 
companies to perform their core business task, so defraying 
their risk, runs the danger of conferring an unfair competitive 
advantage. 
For direct support, as with all interventions, the key M4P test 
of its value is the extent to which it contributes to wider 
development – to systemic change that unleashes more business 
focus on the poor.  This means, among other issues, considering 
how competitors learn and the services that support innovation 
in the market system.
In some cases, this broader change has been stimulated – for 
example vodafone-Safaricom’s M-Pesa banking product in 
Kenya which received DFID support. But in most other cases, 
any benefits are found only in the direct support recipient.
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Second, ‘large-scale’ does not imply that interventions only aim 
at the national level. Scale depends on the nature of the market 
system. In some situations the most pressing obstacles can only 
be addressed at a national level (changes in customs regulation, 
for example). In other cases, change can be affected at a more 
localised level, for instance developing information flows in value 
chains. In others, international action may be required. 
The ambition to achieve large-scale change does not mean 
interventions themselves have to be large in terms of resources. 
Starting small to achieve ambitious objectives may be a perfectly 
valid strategy but small ‘pilot’ projects, if they are to achieve 
larger-scale impact, need to be grounded in the incentives of 
players, the transactions between them and the supporting 
functions required for growth. Small that can only ever be small 
– the worthy tokenism of some development efforts – is not 
consistent with M4P.
3.5 giving meaning and priority to sustainability
Clearly, meaningful development is about more than delivering a 
one-off hit – making lasting change is what differentiates long-term 
development from short-term relief measures. However,  in practice, 
sustainability is often demoted to a secondary concern. Frequently 
what is seen to matter most are final ‘deliverables’ – productivity 
improvement, employment growth, enrolment rates. The means 
through which these might be achieved continually are a distant 
afterthought. Sustainability is a particular priority in M4P and its 
approach to sustainability is distinctive in four ways.
First, sustainability is defined. Sustainability is always concerned both 
with final benefits and with the means (or capacity) through which 
those benefits are achieved. In the context of market systems, 
sustainability can be seen as:
The market system capability to ensure that relevant, differentiated goods 
and services continue to be offered to and consumed by the poor beyond 
the period of an intervention.
Second, sustainability is seen to be intertwined with scaling-up and 
further change. Functioning market systems are never static – they 
have within them the capacity and incentive to be dynamic – to 
grow and to change.  Therefore the remaining sustainability issue to 
be faced is: how will growth and change take place in the future? 
Objectives for sustainability and scale are consistent with each other.
Third, the priority is clear. Inherent within M4P’s focus on 
systemic change is recognition that priority should be given 
to developing capacity in the market system – the means by 
which benefits continue to flow – rather than simply delivering 
benefits directly.
Fourth, sustainability is operationalised into every aspect of 
M4P activities (see Section 4). Initial market analysis shows 
which players are performing and paying for different market 
functions. In considering sustainability, we also need to consider 
who will undertake (who will do) and who will pay for these 
functions in the future. It requires that realistic future scenarios 
be developed for market systems. This requirement to be 
transparent forces interventions to take sustainability into their 
objectives and planning – to plan for sustainability at ‘entry’ 
rather than at ‘exit’. 
For example, if training or information provision in the water 
and sanitation sector – common areas of support for agencies 
– are seen to be important now then there’s every reason 
to consider that they will be important in the future. And an 
obvious sustainability question is posed: who will provide and 
who will pay for training and information services in the future?




low levels of output, productivity and 
investment in African farming.
High prices for water in urban slums in 
latin America.
lack of product innovation in vietnamese 
business.
low prices and struggling sales in the 
ghanaian export craft industry.
initial cause
lack of access to suitable financial 
services.
Small private providers are main 
operators with no public sector role.
Weak legal services associated with 
intellectual property rights and a weak 
legal framework.
Poor product differentiation, productivity 
and professionalism among exporting 
companies.
Underlying cause
Uncertainty and confusion over formal 
title and informal rules in relation to 
traditional rural landholdings acts as 
major disincentive to bank finance. 
Regulatory system provides no protection 
for consumers and doesn’t prevent price 
fixing – while public investment in basic 
infrastructure is absent.
Reform processes and the political 
economy surrounding reform among 
researchers, associations, the media and 
decision-makers are undeveloped.
Weak provision and low use of specialised 
consulting, design and communication 
services (in turn a result of demand-
side hesitancy and supply-side capacity 
weakness).
Distinguishing between causes and symptoms
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3.6 Addressing causes not symptoms
M4P is based around identifying and pursuing the causes 
rather than the symptoms of constraints. In this sense, M4P is 
consistent with the essential principle that genuine development 
is always about addressing fundamental causes of poverty. It 
is an approach led by analysis – in simple terms, a process of 
continually asking ‘why?’ that allows the underlying issues to 
be identified. Two implications emerge from this process of 
narrowing down to the specific constraints that should be the 
focus of intervention. 
First, pursuing underlying systemic causes can take an intervening 
agency to an apparently ‘different place’ from the original focus 
of concern (Table 2). The interconnected nature of markets 
– the fact that one market impinges on another as a supporting 
function – makes this inevitable, and can be an argument for 
concentrating interventions on cross-cutting factor or service 
markets in parallel with, or in advance of, more recognisable 
problems within product-specific markets.
Second, in pursuing the process of distinguishing causes from 
symptoms, a range of potential tools might be used – some 
more complex and resource-intensive than others. There is no 
single ‘magic-bullet’ methodology that must be utilised - the key 
point is not what tools are used, but that the process of analysis 
is of deep enough to provide appropriate guidance for action.
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Box 8
Different roles for government in the Mali water industry
Water delivery in Mali’s towns is undertaken primarily by 
Water Users’ Associations under the overall supervision 
of government. In 1994, in an attempt to improve overall 
performance, the Water Ministry introduced a new Advisory 
Unit providing financial, management and training services to 
the Associations, in exchange for a fixed fee per cubic metre of 
water distributed.
After several years of operation, the Unit appears to be 
achieving positive results. Operating costs of delivering water 
have reduced by more than a half, savings which amount to 
more than six times the Unit’s fees.  And the Unit’s monitoring 
of water consumption, production and costs enable it to identify 
where future opportunities might arise.
While this twin role from government – regulator and technical 
provider – appears to have worked, a question is posed for the 
future. government may have to maintain its regulatory role but 
should it also continue to be a specialist provider of services? 
Or, having introduced this role, should it seek to build it into 
other players within the water market system?
3.7 A facilitation role
M4P requires that organisations play a facilitating role. Standing 
outside of the market system (Figure 4), facilitators work with 
different players within the system, to make it work more 
effectively. Their essential role is active and catalytic, to enable 
others to do rather than do themselves – stimulating changes in 
a market system without becoming part of it.
In practice, the facilitation role can involve many different tasks, 
depending on the nature of the constraints to be addressed 
– strengthening supply-side capacity, introducing new ideas 
and innovations, enhancing networks and exchange, providing 
information, increasing demand-side awareness. This range of 
tasks, however, and the way in which they are conducted should 
always be consistent with a vision of how the market system can 
work more effectively and sustainably in the longer-term. This is 
the guiding discipline that shapes facilitation. 
Four other implications follow from recognition of the nature 
of the facilitation task. First, M4P facilitation is a temporary task. 
learning from other experiences and the dangers of creating 
distortion and dependency, M4P takes the development 
challenge at its word, and sees facilitation as an independent, 
transient role.k 
Second, consistent with the priority given to sustainability, 
facilitators need to consider, realistically and transparently, the 
role of different market players. This is especially important in 
relation to government where – given its limited resources – it 
is crucial to focus on areas of competence and strength.
Third, if M4P facilitation as a temporary role fits well with 
development agency mandates, what about governments, who 
clearly are not temporary players? There are legitimate roles 
for government in different situations – such as regulation, 
information provision and R&D. Can government wear different 
hats and play different roles – one being concerned with M4P 
facilitation (outside the market) and another with delivering 
functions within the market? In principle this separation of roles 
(Box 856) – undertaken by different parts of government – can 
certainly happen but in practice there may be difficulties. This is 
especially the case when it comes to roles such as coordination 
where there is debate over whether a government presence 
is required permanently. And government may find the idea of 
withdrawal from a role unpalatable or impractical to execute.
Fourth, M4P differentiates between short-term temporary 
subsidies that can encourage or facilitate lasting change, and 
longer term recurrent subsidies that might well be required to 
ensure on-going access to ‘merit goods’ – such as water and 
health services. Where long term subsidy is required to ensure 
access, M4P simply asks how this will be provided, and how such 
recurrent expenditure will be financed once support ceases.
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Useful in understanding the poor, 
but less so in relation to the dynamic 
market systems around them, and on 
guidance for intervention.
Useful in mapping out the flow of 
added value, but can understate the 
importance of services required for 
sustained competitiveness.
Can provide an excellent under-
standing of the political economy but 
less instructive in guiding what to do 
to influence it.
Useful in analysing the technical 
challenge of regulatory reform but less 
so in assessing the informal incentives 
and ‘political markets’ impinging on 
change.
geographic focus for analysis with 
emphasis on stakeholder tools and 
participatory processes but no clear 
focus on market systems.
M4P can:
Place the poor within market systems, 
identify the systemic constraints 
affecting their participation, and focus 
interventions accordingly.
Strengthen systemic analysis of value 
chains (including services, fee-based 
and embedded) and provides stronger 
guidance for intervention.
Place the political economy as 
one factor within a wider systemic 
framework of analysis and action.
Place regulations as one factor in 
the wider system of incentives, 
enforcement, services and 
information.
Bring clearer focus on market 
analysis within geographic areas and 
interventions emerging from this.
M4P in relation to common development tools
3.8 An overarching approach
M4P is an overarching approach that guides the assessment 
of market systems, planning for the future and acting to bring 
about change. It is not therefore in competition with more 
specific methodologies or tools. It is built on a framework for 
analysis and action within which they can be used and amended 
so that their strengths are best utilised, limitations addressed 
and effectiveness enhanced (Table 3). 
Similarly, M4P can provide a means through which agencies 
and governments can encourage business activity that is both 
profitable for individual firms and more inclusive towards the 
poor.57 M4P, in other words, can help to differentiate between 
interventions which are simply providing subsidies to private 
firms (largely for private gains) and those which use firm-level 
support to stimulate systemic (public) change (Box 9).
This utility in relation to other tools is strengthened by three 
other complementary characteristics of M4P:
l Multi-disciplinary – applicable to a variety of economic and social 
 fields. It can therefore provide the basis for more coherence in 
 the work of multi-disciplinary agencies and governments.
l Not descriptive – it sets out a framework for understanding 
 and developing the roles of different players in relation to 
 market functions but is not prescriptive in dictating who does 
 (or does not) undertake particular tasks.
l Transparent – while it does not assign players to functions, 
 M4P does provide a transparent basis for assessing the role of 
 different players and requires that these roles are justified 
 in the context of functioning market systems. M4P, in short, 
 provides an open basis for decision-making on interventions.
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Box 9
the potential and limitations of BoP
Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) has attracted much attention 
in recent years. Coined by CK Prahalad, it describes a business 
objective of targeting the vast numbers of poor (primarily as 
consumers) and of offering better products and services to them 
(such as consumer goods) as a profitable business. However, 
while new strategies and investment towards the poor is a 
positive trend, the implications for agencies and governments 
are less clear.
Although BOP recognises the importance of an environment 
that is conducive to innovation for low-income consumers, it 
does not provide a framework to develop such an environment. 
This is not its purpose – but this is the central development task, 
and is the focus of M4P. Potentially, M4P can complement the 
objective and ambition of BOP by addressing the barriers in 
the market system around firms that limit their pursuit of low-
income consumers.
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 4. HOW TO IMPlEMENT M4P?
SUMMARy the M4P approach comprises three elements: 
l A strategic rationale for achieving poverty reduction  
 objectives through market systems development.
l A framework for understanding market systems and  
	 defining	a	realistic	picture	of	sustainability.
 
l guidance for intervention action.
 
M4P’s strategic rationale establishes a hierarchy of objectives 
based on recognition that the poor exist within wider 
market systems. therefore the objective of interventions is 
to stimulate those market systems to work more effectively 
and sustainably for disadvantaged groups – and consequently 
reduce poverty.
in M4P understanding market systems is the basis for all 
interventions – in particular why markets don’t work for the 
poor currently and identifying how they might work more 
effectively in the future. A realistic analysis of sustainability 
is crucial, providing the basis for agencies and governments 
to stimulate and align the incentives and capacity of market 
players so that they play more effective roles in market 
systems.
M4P emphasises explicitly that the role of intervention is 
temporary and catalytic. Agencies should avoid performing 
market roles directly and try to facilitate market players to 
perform more effectively. interventions therefore need to be 
sensitive to local market conditions and seek to stimulate 
deeper and larger change by ‘crowding-in’ other players to 
improve the functioning of the market system. successful 
facilitation,	although	not	a	fixed	model,	requires	organisations	
that have credibility, independence and relevant knowledge 
and skill.
the three elements of M4P are overarching, helping agencies 
position different development methodologies and tools, 
and deploy them more effectively to understand the poor in 




The M4P approach in practice can be broken down into a 
number of main components. This section introduces this 
essential M4P intervention process – and provides the basis 
for planning, implementing and measuring interventions in a 
coherent and effective manner. Drawing on examples from 
the three projects referred to earlier – FinMark Trust in South 
Africa; Katalyst in Bangladesh; and FIT-SEMA in Uganda – it also 
sets the context for the M4P Operational Guide which contains 
more details of how to operationalise M4P.
M4P is an approach that helps agencies and governments to 
shape their poverty reduction interventions. It has been strongly 
influenced by their practical experiences: 
l learning from shortcomings – many interventions have failed 
 to produce sustainable outcomes which incorporate the poor 
 within the economic mainstream because, in their quest for 
 immediate impact, they have: (a) failed to understand adequately 
 market systems and where the poor fit in to them; and (b) 
 been overly-direct or invasive in their actions. Consequently, 
 in some cases, interventions have distorted market systems, 
 perpetuating exclusion and dependency. 
l Informed by success – more facilitative intervention approaches 
 – with clear objectives for sustainability, sound understanding 
 of market systems and an orientation to work with market 
 players – have demonstrated promising levels of impact, scale 
 and sustainability.
Experience shows that intervention in complex systems cannot 
be formulaic or use a step-by-step handbook. M4P’s emphasis on 
indigenous ownership – ie by players within the market system 
rather than external facilitators – requires responsiveness to 
local context, demanding flexibility and enterprise. Successful 
 
figure 5
M4P process within a typical project cycle
 
interventions, however, are not conceived and executed in an 
ad hoc manner, they are guided by overarching strategy and 
underpinned by appropriate analysis. 
In considering the essence of ‘how to implement M4P’, this 
(potential) tension needs to be borne in mind – on the one 
hand a coherent, logical sequential approach and, on the 
other, the need for flexibility and creativity. While the following 
explanation, therefore, may give the impression of M4P as an 
orderly linear progression, in practice, there is a requirement for 
continual learning and adaptation in interventions.
M4P provides agencies with: 
l A strategic rationale: a clear hierarchy of objectives focused 
 on making market systems more inclusive and effective for the 
 poor, which reflects M4P’s vision of large scale and sustainable 
 impact on poverty reduction. 
l Frameworks for : 
	 	 - Developing a detailed understanding of market systems 
    to shape intervention design and action, which reflects the 
    complexity of markets in the real world.
	 	 - Developing a transparent and realistic picture of sustainability, 
    which recognises that ownership within market systems is 
    vital to achieving enduring change. 
l guidance for intervention action: operational principles 
 for facilitating systemic change, which permit flexible, multi- 
 faceted interventions aimed at stimulating market players and 
 functions.
The different components of the M4P approach relate to a typical 
project cycle (Figure 5) so this section is structured to reflect 
the chronology of such a cycle and within each stage of this it 
highlights key questions. Finally, it considers some key attributes 
of organisations who can implement M4P successfully.
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4.2 setting the strategic framework 
M4P requires that agencies set a clear strategic framework 
– a hierarchy of objectives (contained in, for example, a logical 
framework) – which explicitly links objectives for large scale 
poverty reduction with a focus on sustainable market system 
change.
This framework (Figure 6) provides intervening agencies with 
a coherent overarching direction and establishes the basis for 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the effects of their actions .l 
The constituent links in this hierarchy are explained below.
figure 6
strategic framework for M4P
Defining	poverty	reduction	objectives
M4P is about making markets work for the poor. So, defining 
specific poverty reduction objectives is the first key step for any 
intervention – the basic rationale for all development agencies. 
M4P interprets poverty according to context and project type. 
generally M4P interventions will have an ultimate objective 
aimed at improving the socio-economic welfare of disadvantaged 
people, regions or countries. For example, reducing absolute or 
relative levels of deprivation, either income/asset-based or non-
income-based. This entails asking some basic initial questions:
l Which group of poor people is being targeted? 
l What is the profile of that target group, particularly the nature 
 of their economic activity?
l How is their poverty influenced by exclusion, inequality or 
 deprivation in market systems? 
Defining	access	and	growth	objectives
M4P’s ambitions for large-scale impact through increased 
access and growth means that, from the outset, agencies must 
identify market systems which have the potential to work well 
for significant groups of poor people. There must also be a 
reasonable prospect of bringing about durable pro-poor change. 
Agencies must take care not simply to rush to where the poor 
are without first understanding where there is realistic potential 
for change (Figure 7).
Key questions include: 
l Are there reasonable prospects of affecting significant numbers 
 of poor people?
l Which market systems are important to the target group and 
 what is the nature of their engagement in those systems?
l In what ways might improving the market system(s) enhance 
 access and growth?
l Is intervention likely to be feasible given the resources 
 available?
To achieve its ultimate objective, M4P aims to enhance 
the poor’s access to opportunities and their capacity to 
respond to opportunities within the economic mainstream, 
either as producers/entrepreneurs, workers or consumers. 
This means58:
l Stepping up – improvements in existing market systems: 
 increased productivity or value-added; more (or better) 
 employment; more appropriate goods and services.
l Stepping out – new market systems: access to new markets; 
 new employment; new goods and services.
l Hanging in – for extremely disadvantaged groups: reducing or 
 mitigating vulnerability or instability.
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A focus on media system change in Uganda
Many agencies pay mass media channels to provide information 
to the poor. FIT-SEMA recognised that the media is more than 
a one-way distribution channel. Effective media can provide 
voice to the poor and act as a restraint on the powerful. FIT-
SEMA therefore sought to understand how the media could 
better serve the poor and directed its interventions towards 
improving the FM radio system, focusing on radio stations and 
wider supporting functions, such as investigative journalism 
practices, production services and audience research. 
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Defining	systemic	change	objectives
M4P seeks to stimulate sustainable change in markets systems 
that are important for the poor. Agencies and governments 
therefore need to identify specific dimensions of those systems 
that they wish to change – what is ‘wrong’ and needs to be 
addressed if market systems are to shift from their existing 
path (Box 10). The key question therefore is: what are the key 
dimensions of specific market systems which interventions will 
seek to change?
Market system change might include:
l Improved delivery (such as increase in access or participation 
 rates, improved quality or levels of satisfaction).
l Changes in practices, roles and performance of important 
 system players and functions.
l Changed attitudes of, and evident ownership by, market 
 players.
l Demonstrated dynamism of market players and functions (for 
 example, responsiveness to changed conditions in the system). 
l Independent and continuing activity in the system (ie the 
 extent to which changes are maintained after direct intervention 
 support has ceased).
The systemic change objectives that facilitators pursue may vary 
greatly, depending on their perspective and capacity. For example, 
one approach to connecting an under-served population might 
be to enlarge and deepen the existing mainstream system to 
expand the ‘access frontier’. Another might be to establish 
separate ‘providers for the poor’ and then connect them to the 
mainstream – an approach which may allow an immediate direct 





The process-oriented nature of M4P requires responsive 
and multi-faceted interventions. The main strategic focus and 
direction of interventions should be clear in order to guide 
decision-making and M&E in a dynamic context. The minutiae 
of activities, however, cannot be ‘locked down’ in advance. 
Intervention strategy should be based on a clear vision of 
change and pathway towards exit, but should permit operational 
flexibility to be responsive to market players. Typically, this 
means establishing the main focal areas of intervention, within 
which multi-faceted intervention activities that are responsive to 
prevailing conditions can be pursued.
From the outset, intervention has to establish a framework for 
assessing market system change. Effective M&E is necessary 
not just to demonstrate results but to provide feedback on 
performance. Arguably, the systemic nature of M4P, and the fact 
that the time from interventions to final impact can be relatively 
long compared with the illusory ‘wham’ of direct delivery, renders 
M&E especially important for M4P. Key questions include:
l What is the impact logic (or causal model) of the intervention?
l What are the key indicators at each level?
l Is the choice of indicators providing the right targets/incentives 
 for interventions?
l Is there an adequate approach to attribution and to assessing 
 wider change beyond immediate partners?
















In a context of heated public debate about the poor’s exclusion 
from formal financial services, FinMark analysed the reasons for 
exclusion in considerable depth. As a result, FinMark focused on 
two key constraints, stakeholder coordination and specialised 
information services for commercial banks, while in contrast, 
many other development initiatives were focusing on poverty 
banking models.  
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The purpose of the strategic framework is, by definition, to 
provide overall strategic direction – not to tie facilitators down 
to specific operational detail. How much detail is often a point of 
tension between funders (who like more) and facilitators (less). 
In practice, managing this tension and balancing accountability 
and flexibility requires setting out basic programme design 
parameters (such as the main impact logic) and clarifying 
responsibilities between funders and facilitators.
4.3 Understanding market systems
The complexity of market systems requires that intervention 
is guided by a good understanding of specific market systems, 
including a diagnosis of the symptoms and causes of under-
performance. M4P interventions require a strong emphasis on 
information gathering and interpretation, not out of academic 
interest, but to shape design, ascertain prospects for sustainability 
and guide actions throughout the course of intervention. An 
agency’s understanding of market systems can never be perfect 
– the ‘paralysis by analysis’ syndrome must be avoided – but it 
has to be sufficiently strong to provide the basis for informed 
action (Box 11).
Information gathering is not a large-scale, formal activity only 
conducted at the design stage. Interventions in dynamic socio-
economic contexts will always be iterative in nature, requiring 
constant feedback and adaptation. Nor is information gathering 
to be regarded purely as a resource for planning, design and 
measurement.  An intervention’s new insights developed through 
analysis can enrich weak information environments and serve as 
a powerful tool for changing the perceptions or behaviour of 
market players – often more effectively than financial support. 
Information gathering for M4P interventions should draw from 
a variety of sources ranging from pilot activities to stakeholder 
feedback. However, whatever the source however, M4P places 
a premium on gathering intelligence and deploying it effectively. 
Key questions are:
l What are the underlying causes of a market system’s under 
 performance?
l What are the main reasons why the poor’s participation is 
 currently weak?
l What are the primary challenges to increase their level of 
 participation?
The livelihoods of poor people are affected by the market 
systems in which they operate – which, in turn, are affected by 
other market systems and the broader socio-economic context. 
So the key challenge is to be sufficiently focused on developing 
a sound understanding of the operations of specific market 
systems while maintaining an informed awareness of wider 
context, such as patterns of trade, international standards and 
macroeconomic performance. 
This requires a diagnostic process – provision for which must 
be reflected in planning and budgeting – which assists in moving 
from a broad awareness to a sharper understanding of the 
specific market system constraints to be addressed – from 
symptoms to causes (see Figure 8).
Figure 8 also illustrates that M4P interventions may need a 
diversity of tools for analysis and understanding that cover the 
different dimensions of market systems and the broader socio-
economic context of intervention. There is no single analytical 
tool that does it all, but a range of tools are available. M4P 
does not generally seek to introduce new or displace existing 
tools. The purpose of M4P frameworks is to help practitioners 
make sense of the different types of information they might 
require, determine which of the myriad information tools they 
might use, and interpret the information generated for effective 
intervention design and action. 
The key point to recognise is that M4P interventions use analysis 
to guide action, but do so within the confines of available resources 
(different tools have different resource implications) according 
to the requirements of context. For example, M4P uses market 
system analysis to identify market players and their interests to 
determine their appropriateness for engagement. This contrasts 
with many conventional development approaches which seek to 
engage with as broad a range of stakeholders as possible in the 
interests of ensuring participation and building consensus. M4P 
uses information to act in a more focused manner, and to ensure 
meaningful participation and ownership from market players.
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M4P also recognises that paucity of information in weak market 
situations is often an indication that information gathering and 
analytical capacity within market systems is limited. Therefore, 
where feasible, M4P interventions seek to develop and transfer 
analytical capacity to market players – for example by working 
hand-in-hand to conduct analysis – so that the information 
function (gathering, interpretation and distribution) can continue 
in the future. 
4.4 Defining sustainable outcomes
Sustainability is central to the M4P approach. Interventions are 
guided by an understanding of market systems and, in particular, 
of the constraints that inhibit market development. However, in 
parallel with this analysis, it is important to develop a clear view 
of where an intervention is going – of how it is envisaged that the 
market system will operate in a sustainably in the longer-term. 
While sustainability holds a prominent place in development 
vocabulary and is generally seen to be important, it is seldom 
defined tightly or operationalised into tangible objectives 
and activities. M4P considers sustainability throughout the 
implementation process – when setting objectives, conducting 
market analysis, designing interventions and taking action.
M4P regards sustainability (see Section 3) as the market 
system capability to ensure that relevant, differentiated goods 
and services continue to be offered to and consumed by the 
poor beyond the period of an intervention. In practical terms 
therefore a transparent view of sustainability is one that defines 
market capability in depth, linking market players with market 
functions by addressing two key questions: who does (and in the 
future who will do) and who pays (and who will pay)?
figure 8
 the M4P diagnostic process and a selection of tools of analysis utilised
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Using these two key questions, M4P develops the market 
system construct into a simple framework which facilitators can 
use to examine the specific combinations of market functions 
and players which are necessary for a market to work better in 
the future (Figure 9).
In considering their future vision and in order that this does 
not simply become a mechanistic exercise in box-filling, 
interventions should consider five determining factors. Three of 
these are ‘given’ and are not changeable through interventions 
– the nature of specific market systems; history; and the 
innovation landscape – and two are ‘open’ to influence through 
interventions – capacity and incentives.
What is the nature of the specific market system(s) in question? 
Markets are inherently different. For example, they differ with 
respect to the degree and nature of information asymmetry 
(such as in commodity markets where poor producers typically 
know less than large players), and of externalities (basic services 
potentially have major implications for society as a whole) which 
are central in determining the nature of public role required.
The key point is that market systems differ greatly, and these 
differences have implications for the combination of functions 
and players that make up the market system. The challenge for 
interventions in any context is how to interpret the varying 













Who does? Who pays?
fUtUre  vision
Facilitating intervention
Determined by 5 factors :





m Referred to as ‘path dependence’ in economics literature.   
Box 12
Assessing sustainability in the vegetable sector, Bangladesh
Katalyst’s analysis of information constraints showed a range 
of potential information sources for farmers – including 
government, input suppliers, retailers and NgOs. Examination 
of the historical performance, capacity and incentives of these 
sources led to the conclusion that only large suppliers had the 
potential to sustainably adopt and adhere to new practices.
The challenge then was how to bring about this change – this 
vision of the future – focused on supply companies and their 
retail counterparts.
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What is the historical context of the market? 
Different histories and traditions lead to wide variations in 
institutions and capacity between countries. An acknowledged 
failure in development has been the practice of exporting 
apparently successful structures or practices from one country 
– with limited understanding of the reasons for their success 
– to another country whose institutional realities are markedly 
different. Interventions should take into account historical 
factors that have shaped the current arrangements of a market 
system when considering how that market might work better 
in the future. 
What relevant innovations might inform realignment of functions 
and players? 
Development interventions are about stimulating change. It 
is therefore important to be aware of the wider ‘innovation 
landscape’, such as innovation in the collaboration between 
public and private players which can often be the key to 
improving a market system’s performance. For example, recent 
improvements to vocational training in Peru – manifested in 
training outcomes and job placements – can be attributed 
to a shift in government role from direct provision to private 
sector training delivery, enabled by a framework of oversight 
set by a partnership of government, employers’ and employees’ 
organisations, together with targeted subsidies for disadvantaged 
groups.59 
What are the underlying incentives for change? 
In recognising institutional differences between countries, 
there is however a risk that interventions become a prisoner 
of moribund institutional structures which – even if they are 
traditional – are not delivering.m Interventions must strike 
a balance between change that is ambitious and change that 
has a realistic chance of success. The actual process of change 
is therefore as important as the vision of the future. For this 
reason, stakeholder incentives are central to any consideration 
of the roles of different players. For instance, the main advocates 
for government subsidies – such as fuel subsidies in India which 
account for 2% of government expenditure – are generally not 
the poor but higher income groups who have captured the 
benefits and are a formidable obstacle to change. In building a 
valid and realistic vision of the future, understanding incentives 
so that interventions can be aligned to them is central in shaping 
a valid and realistic vision of the future (Box 12).
What is the prevailing capacity of market players? 
The message here is a simple one; role has to fit with capacity.   yet, 
in practice, capacity is often ignored. In weak market situations, 
the capacity of market players – both public and private – is 
correspondingly fragile. For example, governments who have 
provided services in the past but do so ineffectively are also 
likely to be weak in other functions – such as regulation or 
information. So any revision of roles has to address new capacity 
issues. Interventions need to be guided by a realistic assessment 
of the distinctive core competence of market players – of what 
they can do.
The key point is that M4P is particularly concerned with the 
economic and institutional sustainability of different functions in 
market systems. It places great emphasis on thinking through the 
respective roles of private, government and civil society actors. 
Through its focus on understanding institutional realities and the 
capacity and incentives of different players M4P actively seeks to 
stimulate realistic and sustainable market development. 
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4.5 facilitating systemic change
The M4P approach seeks to change markets systems through 
interventions that are facilitative or catalytic in nature, ie they 
bring about change which alters the way in which a market 
system operates into the longer term, without the agent of 
change remaining within the market system. 
If this then is the principle, what does facilitation mean in 
practice and what might facilitators actually do? As the examples 
from Bangladesh (vegetables), Uganda (radio) and South Africa 
(financial services) illustrate, interventions can include a range 
of activities:
l Technical assistance to supply-side players (radio and 
 vegetables) – and then to the providers of specialist advice.
l Introducing a new business idea (such as retailer training in 
 vegetables) and providing technical support to develop this, 
 and limited financial support to defray initial risk.
l Establishing a forum for new ideas and exchange (financial 
 services).
l Providing technical assistance and some financial support to 
 regulators and researchers to improve the process of policy 
 analysis (financial services).
l Offering information to other players in the market on new 
 opportunities (radio)
l Developing a new commercial service – when it was clear 
 that no one else in the market could or would do it (financial 
 services).
This breadth of activity does not, however, mean that facilitation 
is an undisciplined rag-tag of ‘things to do’ (a common 
misapprehension – see Box 13). Interventions inevitably will 
comprise myriad actions and need to be sufficiently flexible to 
respond to conditions on the ground. A step-by-step guide is 
therefore not realistic. But they are guided first by the strategic 
imperative of ‘crowding-in’ other players and activity and, second, 
by some key operating principles.
Developing an approach to crowding-in is central to facilitating 
system change. Crowding-in refers to how an intervention (or 
series of interventions) can help to catalyse or bring other players 
and functions into the market system so that it works better for 
the poor. Figure 10 sets out three steps to operationalise this 
‘pathway to crowding-in’.
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Box 13
What do facilitators do?
While the facilitator’s role might be clear in theory, there remains 
an air of mystery over what facilitation means in practice. Funding 
agencies, sensing the potential of the approach but frustrated 
by a perceived lack of specifics, ask “But what is it that you do... 
exactly? ” To which facilitators commonly respond, with equal 
frustration, “well, it depends…”
So what do facilitators do? The following gives a flavour of 
the activities undertaken for one intervention* – Katalyst’s 
introduction of training as an embedded service from 
agricultural input suppliers to retailers in order to improve the 
information flow to vegetable farmers (see Box 5, in Section 1). 
Once initial market analysis had been undertaken, tasks were 
divided (slightly arbitrarily) into those done during the initial 
phase and those undertaken periodically throughout the two-
year intervention period.
initially
l Identify and approach potential partners over possible 
 collaboration.
l Develop ideas, negotiate and finalise agreement with one lead 
 firm.
l With lead firm: 
  - Develop methodology, content and structure of  
   programme.
  - Familiarise lead firm trainers with approach.
  - Agree on logistics, venue and costs.
  - Observe and review initial programmes.
  - Refine programme after feedback.
Periodic
l Review progress against targets and monitor participant 
 feedback.
l Monitor participants’ use of training and perceptions of value.
l Manage cost-sharing financial support to lead firm for 
 delivery of programmes.
l Monitor wider developments in sector, including competitors’ 
 response.
l Establish baseline for impact study and undertake impact 
 assessment.
l Commission and manage external case study, including 
 dissemination.
l Start discussions with lead firm and other players on next 
 steps to promote crowding in.
* Several interventions usually take place concurrently.
Market working better 
for the poor
Market not working 
for the poor
Period of temporary intervention
Step 1: Initial interventions
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figure 10
the pathway to crowding-in
Step 1
Having something to build on – initial interventions are often 
small-scale pilot projects or research-oriented activities. The 
purpose of these is to test ideas (typically a new service or 
product) with a committed partner as the basis (if successful) 
for stimulating further activity – which might require further 
(different) interventions. 
Step 2
Having a vision of the future – a future picture of how the 
market should operate in the future is driven by the ambition of 
a facilitator with respect to different features of market change 
such as breadth (more transactions in the core of the market) 
and depth (supporting functions and rules).
Step 3
Developing other interventions to stimulate change – while in 
some cases, crowding-in may simply happen, in many instances it 
will require further action. Part of crowding-in may be concerned 
with commercial rivals ‘copying’ the actions of an innovative 
market leader. But crowding-in is not only replication (‘more 
of the same now’): it is about stimulating other supporting 
functions so that the depth of the market system is improved 
(not just ‘more now’ but ‘better in the future’). 
Crowding-in demonstrates what is distinctive about facilitators 
especially in relation to commercial players in a market. With 
their own private organisational perspective, commercial players 
seek to develop the market for themselves and essentially 
want to keep out others who don’t contribute to their goals. 
In contrast a facilitator, with a public, institutional perspective, 
wishes to bring in other activity that contributes to the overall 
efficiency of the market system so that it is both more inclusive 
and competitive.
given a strategic commitment to crowding-in, there are a 
number of guidance principles (rather than fixed rules) to be 
taken into consideration (Box 14).
l Ownership – seeking to ensure that ownership – psychological, 
 legal and economic – lies with market players so that they 
 have the wherewithal to continue after a period of intervention 
 has ended.
l Relationships – developing transactional relationships between 
 facilitators and market players based around quid pro quo 
 exchange (rather than unconditional giving – a classic welfare 
 relationship). Relationships might contain a financial exchange 
 (most don’t) or might be contractual in nature (or on a less 
 formal basis) but, however they are defined, to be successful 
 they must encourage commitment and ownership.
l Appropriate resource levels – externally-funded interventions 
 (especially from foreign donors) can easily displace market 
 mechanisms, replacing them with activities in a way which 
 can’t continue without further infusions of funds. Interventions 
 therefore have to be sufficiently resourced to make a difference 
 – but not to the extent that they cause negative distortion.
  
So, in considering facilitation a number of key questions are 
posed:
l Do intervention activities relate to a potential market function 
 in the future or are they ‘one-off ’ activities?
l Are relationships with the ‘right’ players – in terms of what 
 they do, their motivations and their capacities?
l Is the nature of the relationship one that encourages ownership 
 and commitment?
l Is the type of support offered by the facilitator – in amount 
 and kind (technical support, finance etc) – appropriate?
l Underpinning all these questions, is intervention encouraging 
 crowding-in; ie ‘opening the door’ for market players to 
 perform market functions more effectively?
4.6 key attributes of facilitators
The main stages in successful implementation of M4P defined 
above – the strategic framework, understanding market systems, 
defining sustainable outcomes and facilitating change – all 
emerge from the experience of M4P projects. But one other 
‘active’ factor is of central importance, namely the characteristics 
of the facilitating organisation itself.
There are no fixed rules about the specific organisational form 
of a facilitator – project, trust etc – but, whatever the structure, 
facilitators need to show a number of characteristics, all of which 
are apparent in Katalyst, FinMark and FIT-SEMA.
Closeness
Arelationship with market players which shows understanding 
and informed empathy but without being captured by them. 
The task of facilitation can be seen as acting as a bridge between 
the public objectives of funders (agencies and government) and 
the narrow, private aims of individual market players.
Knowledge and insight
Knowing enough to be able to analyse a market system and 
assess opportunities to intervene and add value.
Entrepreneurial instincts
Married to knowledge, the capacity to see where opportunities 
may lie and be able to shape and convey an ‘offer’ to different 
players in the market that responds to their situation and 
addresses systemic constraints.
Independence
A status that allows facilitators to be and – equally as important 
– to be seen to be independent in the eyes of market players so 
that their role and their status is understood and accepted.
These qualities allow facilitators to develop credibility and 
respect, and a growing capability to intervene effectively. Indeed, 
the evidence from successful experiences shows that credibility 
is not acquired instantly – these qualities develop and accumulate 
over time and with experience.
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Box 14
facilitating systemic change in Uganda
FIT-SEMA’s initial intervention to improve the way the media 
served the poor started with one leading radio station, testing 
new, more responsive programming formats and practices. 
Once this trial had proved successful, FIT-SEMA sought 
out other players to work with, seeing crowding-in as vital 
for diversity, competition and broader change. Throughout 
its interventions they took pains not to become involved 
directly in financing broadcasters or in developing programme 
content. FIT- SEMA saw these functions as integral to the media 
system and recognised the distortionary dangers from direct 
involvement.
In behaving in this way – and in developing transactional 
relationships with partners – FIT-SEMA was able to differentiate 
itself from the approaches of other donor-supported projects 
(buying air time and dictating content) common in the industry.
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